박정희 - 도널드 그레그 -

“박정희 1972년 핵개발 착수…1977년 포기했다”
[5·16 쿠데타 50년] 미군이 1973년 베트남서 철수하자 한국은 동맹에 대한 믿음을 잃었다. 박정희는 ‘스스로 지켜야 한다’고 생각했을 것이다. 이 사실을 알고 미국이 핵개발을 멈추게 했다.
	권태호 기자

» 도널드 그레그 전 주한 미국대사가 1968년 한국을 방문했을 당시, 서울 인사동에서 구입했다는 조선시대의 옛 도자기 한 점을 들어 보여주고 있다. 도널드 그레그, 박정희 정권을 말하다 도널드 그레그 전 주한미국 대사는 대사로 부임(재임 1989~1993년)하기 앞서 1970년대 유신 정권 초기 미 중앙정보국 한국지부 총책임자로 있으며 박정희 정권을 상대적으로 깊숙히 지켜볼 수 있었던 인물 중 하나다. 그레그 전 대사는 박정희 정권에 대해 “경제발전이라는 ‘빛’과 독재라는 ‘그림자’를 동시에 지닌 인물”이라고 평가했다. 그는 박 전 대통령의 독재정치에 대해 강하게 비판하면서도, 그가 이룩한 경제발전에 대해서는 높이 평가했다. 그는 또 박 전 대통령이 1972년 핵무기 개발을 시도했으나, 미국의 강한 반대로 몇 년 뒤 이를 포기했다고 이야기했다. 이달초 뉴욕주 아몽크에 있는 자택을 찾아 그레그를 인터뷰했다.　   ■ 1961년 쿠데타 - 쿠데타 이야기부터 시작하자. 1961년 5월 이전에 미국은 한국 군부의 쿠데타 정보를 미리 파악하거나 쿠데타 가능성을 염두에 두진 않았었나? 그 가능성을 감지하지 못했나?     “몰랐다. 당시 나는 일본에 있었고, 한국은 장면 정부였다. 미국은 장면 정부가 들어섰을 때, 한국이 민주주의를 향해 움직이고 있다는 점에서 상당한 기대를 했다. 그러나 그는 정치상황을 제대로 다루지 못했다. 그래서 나는 박정희가 쿠데타를 일으켰다는 소식을 들었을 때 그렇게 많이 놀라진 않았다. 박정희의 등장에 대해 우린(미국은) 판단을 내리기 복잡한 상태였다. 그는 일본의 군사훈련을 받았고, 또 한때 좌익이었다. 그래서 그가 어떤 인물인지 매우 혼란스러웠다. 그러나 그가 매우 강력한 지도자이고, 한국의 경제발전에 대한 비전을 갖고 있다는 것을 금방 알게 됐다. 그러나 그와 동시에 그가 독재자라는 것도 알았다.”   - 박정희는 쿠데타를 일으킨 명분으로, 당시 사회가 혼란스러워 북한의 공격으로부터 취약하다는 것을 이유로 들었다. 당시 미국의 평가는 어떠했나? 당시 한국사회는 안정으로 가기 힘들었나?   “한반도 분단은 미국 때문이다. 한국민들에게 죄송하게 생각한다. 북한은 1950년대에 남한보다 국력이 훨씬 강했다. 군사적으로, 경제적으로 모두. 1960년대에 북한의 침략에 대한 남한의 공포는 매우 컸다. 또 당시 김일성은 북한에서 매우 강력한 지도자였고, 소련의 강력한 지지를 받고 있었다. 당시 남한의 장면 정부는 매우 진보적이었지만, 강력하지 않았다. 북한이 이를 틈타 공격한다면, 남한은 무너졌을 것이다. 나는 그것이 박정희의 쿠데타 동기 중 하나가 됐다고 본다.”   - 미국은 5·16 쿠데타에 대해 아무런 제어도 하지 않았다. 박 정권이 친미반공 정권이 될 것으로 보고, 이를 묵인한 것 아닌가?   “(쿠데타 당시) 미 정부 안에서 두가지 반응이 있었다고 생각한다. 하나는 장면 정부가 (1960년 정권교체 이후) 효과적으로 대처하지 못한 점에 대한 실망감, 그리고 국방성을 중심으로 박정희가 반공 군부 지도자라는 점에서 북한으로부터의 공격에 효과적으로 대처할 수 있다는 기대감이 있었다고 본다.”   - 당시 케네디 대통령의 (쿠데타에 대한) 견해는 무엇이었을까?   “당시 케네디의 관심은 온통 (1961년 4월17일 벌어진) 미국의 쿠바 피그만 침공 실패에 집중돼 있었다. 이어 1962년에는 쿠바 미사일 위기가 닥친다. 그는 아마 한국에 관심을 기울일 여유가 없었을 것이다.”   - 그러면 당시 한국 상황에 대한 미국 행정부내의 반응은 무엇이었나?   “당시 미국의 일반적인 반응은 박정희는 반공주의자인 장군이고, (어쨌든) 그가 정권을 장악한 건 사실이다. 미국은 이를 반대하진 않겠다는 정도였을 것이다.”   - 미국이 박정희를 좋아했다는 뜻인가?   “좋아했다기보단, 받아들였다고 봐야할 것이다. 당시 미국의 외교정책은 냉전의 관점에서 해당 국가의 국내정책을 바라봤다. 정부의 방향이 공산주의냐, 반공이냐 하는 게 가장 중요했다. 어떤 나라에서 누군가가 정권을 장악했다고 할 때, (그 정부가 반공주의 정부라면) 오케이다. 한국의 경우, 당시 장면 정부는 강력하지 않았고, 매우 강력한 반공주의자에 의해 정권이 교체됐다. 미국이 새 지도자와 싸울 필요가 없다. 그가 경제를 발전시킬 수 있도록 돕자는 게 당시 미국의 결정이라고 봐야 한다.” » 도널드 그레그 ■ 유신정권 도래 - 1973년 이전에 한국에 온 적이 있나?   “1968년에 한국을 처음 방문했을 때, 온나라가 경제발전을 시작하면서 에너지에 차 있는 것을 보고 깊은 인상을 받았다. 그래서 그때 나는 미 중앙정보국(CIA)에 한국 발령을 요청했고, 1973년 미 중앙정보국 한국지부 총책임자로 한국에 왔다.”   - 1968년과 1973년의 경제상황은 많이 달랐을텐데….   “완전히 달랐다. 당시 한국에는 박태준, 남덕우, 정주영, 이병철 등 공공·민간 부문 양쪽에 매우 뛰어난 이들이 있었다.”   - 비판론자들은 박정희가 장기독재 체제인 유신정권을 수립하면서 1970년대에 더욱 경제발전에 가속도를 냈다. 이는 유신에 대한 정당화를 위한 수단이었다는 지적도 있다.   “그렇다. 그것이 박정희가 지닌 양면성이다. 박정희의 한쪽 면이 박태준, 남덕우, 정주영, 이병철이라면, 또다른 한쪽 면이 이후락, 박동선 등이다. 빛과 그림자다. 내가 1973년에 한국에 왔을 때, 당시 주한미대사인 필립 하비브는 내게 이렇게 말했다. ‘한 가지 규칙만 지켜라. 절대 박동선을 만나지 말고, 그와 어떤 일도 하지 마라’는 것이다. (로비스트인) 박동선이 미국 관리들에게 접근해 로비를 벌이는 것을 염려했기 때문이다.”   - 이후락(중앙정보부장)은 어떠했나?   “내가 처음 이후락 부장을 만나러 가보니, 주한미대사관 맞은 편에 있는 그의 사무실은 빌딩의 맨 꼭대기층 한 층 전부였다. 엄청나게 넓었다. 아마 청와대 대통령 집무실보다 훨씬 넓었을 것이다. 내가 들어서자 옆에서 사진을 찍었고, 5~6명의 참모들이 배석했다. 마치 국가원수와 접견하는 듯했다. 나는 그를 좋아하지 않았다. 당시 나는 한국의 중앙정보부가 매우 위험한 조직이라고 생각했다. 당시 중정의 관심은 국내정치에 치중했고, 그것도 정권에 대한 반대를 억누르는데 집중했다. 정보기관의 주임무는 정보(fact)를 파악하는 것이라는 내 생각과 많이 달랐다.   (1972년 5월 평양을 다녀온) 이후락에게 평양에 가서 김일성을 만난 소감을 물어보았다. 그때 그는 “(김일성은) 매우 강한 인물이다”라는 말만 반복했다. 나는 그때 이후락이 ‘총을 꺼내서 그를 쏘고 싶었다’고 말할 줄 알았다. 그러나 정반대였다. 그 이후 나는 (1972년 10월) 유신의 뿌리가 이후락의 북한에 대한 해석에도 닿아있지 않나 하는 생각을 하곤 했다. 아마 이후락은 박정희에게 ‘우리가 그들과 대화를 하려면, 북한의 김일성처럼 우리도 그만큼 강력한 지도력을 가져야 한다’고 말했을 지 모른다.”   - 결국 남북한의 양쪽 지도자가 모두 남북대화를 자신들의 독재 강화에 이용한 것인가?   “그렇다. 박 정권이 이후락을 평양으로 보낸 데에는 남북한의 점진적 평화 가능성에 대한 판단을 하려는 것과 함께 김일성에 대한 평가를 내리려는 약삭빠른 의도가 있었던 것으로 본다.”   “이후락의 김일성 면담이 유신 낳았을수도” 이후락은 1972년 5월 평양을 다녀온 뒤 `김일성은 매우 강한 인물’이란 말을 반복했다. 그가 박정희에게 ‘우리도 강력한 지도력을 가져야 한다’고 말했을지 모른다.   ■ 김대중 납치와 최종길 교수 고문치사   - 당신은 김대중 전 대통령을 (박정희와 전두환으로부터) 두 번이나 구한 인물로 유명하다. 1973년 김대중 납치 당시를 설명해달라.   “하비브 대사가 어느날 내게 전화를 걸어와 ‘김대중이 도쿄의 호텔에서 납치됐다. 그들은 김대중을 죽일 것이다. 내일 아침까지 김대중이 어디에 있는지, 그리고 누가 김대중을 납치했는지를 확인해 보고하라. 우리는 그를 살릴 수 있을지도 모른다’고 내게 지시했다. 나는 다음날 아침, 하비브에게 ‘중정이 김대중을 납치했으며, 김대중은 대한해협의 배 위에 손발이 묶인 채로 있다’고 보고했다. 김대중이 납치됐을 때, 중정이 이를 감행했다는 것은 내가 이후락을 처음 만났을 때 가졌던 인상에 비춰볼 때, 하나도 놀라운 일이 아니었다.”   - 하비브 대사는 김대중의 납치를 어떻게 알게 됐나?   “일본 경찰이 하비브 대사에게 납치 정보를 줬다.”   - 하비브 대사는 이후 어떻게 했나?   “그는 박정희 대통령에게 편지를 보냈다. ‘중정이 김대중을 납치했다. 김대중을 죽여서는 안된다’고. 하비브 대사가 곧바로 청와대로 달려가 박 대통령을 만나는 대신, 편지를 보낸 것은 박 대통령에게 생각할 시간을 주기 위해서였다.”   - 박정희의 5·16 쿠데타를 사실상 묵인했던 미국이 김대중의 납치에는 그렇게 발빠르게 움직인 이유는 뭔가?   “우리는 김대중이 상징하는 가치가 뭔지를 정확히 알고 있었다. 장면으로 상징됐던 ‘민주화’, 당시에는 김대중이 그 상징이었다. 만일 김대중이 박정희에 의해 살해된다면, 이것은 한국의 민주주의를 또한번 뒤로 후퇴시켰을 것이다. 그리고 우리는 자신의 정적을 살해하는 정부와 밀접한 관계를 유지하고 싶지 않았다. 우리는 김대중을 살리기 위해 무척 애썼다.”　   - 당시 김대중을 살린 것은 하비브 대사와 당신이다. 그러나 미국 정부는 5·16 쿠데타 당시에도 그러했던 것처럼 박정희 정권이 김대중을 어떻게 하든지 상관하지 않았던 건 아닌가?   “아니다. 절대 아니다. (미국 정부는) 김대중의 납치에 대해 매우 크게 걱정했고, 관여했다.”   - 당시 하비브 대사가 본국의 지시를 받고 당신에게 지시를 내리고, 박정희에게 편지를 보낸 건 아니지 않나?   “그건 당시 상황이 워낙 급박했기 때문이다. 매우 빨리 서둘러야 했다. 그리고 당시 한국에 대해선 하비브가 책임자였다.”   - 그렇다면, 일단 조치를 취한 뒤 본국에 보고했다는 뜻인가?   “그렇다. 하비브가 내게 전화를 걸어 이렇게 말했다. ‘서두르지 않으면 김대중이 죽는다. 그렇다면 김대중이 죽을 뿐 아니라, 앞으로 우리와 박정희와의 관계도 훨씬 더 어려워진다’고. 박정희가 김대중을 죽였다는 것을 알고 있을 때, 우리가 박정희를 어떻게 대할 수 있겠나? 결국 김대중이 살았고, 그것이 박정희와의 관계를 지속하는데도 도움을 줬다.”   - 미국이 김대중을 박정희 이후 새로운 정치세력의 대안으로 생각했나?   “물론이다.”   - 박정희가 (그런 미국의 생각을) 읽었던 것 아닌가?   “아마 박정희는 그점을 두려워했으리라 본다. 그가 유신으로 향한 또다른 이유는 그가 더이상의 선거를 두려워했기 때문이었을 것이다. 그는 (1971년 대선에서) 김대중에 거의 질 뻔 했다.”   - 당시 납치는 이후락의 지시였나? 박정희의 지시였나?   “박정희와 이후락은 함께 술을 마시곤 했다. 어느날 밤 박정희가 술에 취해 김대중을 욕하며, 김대중을 죽여버렸으면 좋겠다는 식의 말을 했을 것이다. 그러자 이후락이 박정희의 뜻을 알고, 이를 감행했을 수도 있다. 지난 2008년 김대중 전 대통령을 만나 물어보았다. ‘당시 납치는 누구의 지시였냐?’고. 김 전 대통령은 ‘박정희의 지시였다’고 내게 답했다. 다만 그건 김대중의 추측이다.”   - 당시 납치가 위협만 하고, 죽이려고 하진 않았다는 주장도 있다.   “아니다. 그들은 분명 김대중을 죽이려 했다. 김대중이 내게 말하기를 ‘나는 배 위에서 기도하고, 죽을 준비를 했다. 그런데 그때 미 중앙정보국의 비행기가 배 위를 선회했다’고 말했다. 미 중앙정보국은 비행기를 보내지 않았다. 잘못 알려져 있다. 그건 아마 김대중을 찾으려는 일본의 경찰기였거나, 아니면 ‘김대중을 죽이지 마라’는 지시를 내린 한국의 비행기였을 것이다. 왜냐하면 비행기가 다녀간 뒤 김대중은 배에서 손발이 풀려났다.”　   - 당신은 이후 최종길 교수 고문치사 사건에 대해 이후락에게 항의한 것으로 알려져 있다.   “그렇다. 김대중 납치 사건으로 인해 서울대에서 항의시위가 벌어졌고, 그 와중에 최종길 서울대 교수가 중정에서 조사를 받던 중 숨졌다. 우리는 중정이 고문을 하다 최 교수가 숨지자, 유리창 바깥으로 시신을 떨어뜨려 자살을 위장했는지, 아니면 최 교수가 더이상의 고문을 피하려고 유리창으로 뛰어내렸는지 정확히 모른다. 그러나 최 교수가 고문당했고, 그가 유리창 바깥으로 떨어졌다는 것은 분명하다.”   - 최 교수가 고문당한 것을 어떻게 알았느냐?   “더이상 자세히는 말하기 곤란하다. 그러나 우린 (당시) 무슨 일이 벌어졌는지 알았다.”   - 최 교수가 중정의 고문으로 숨졌다고 믿나?   “그렇다. 당시 나는 미국 중앙정보국 본부에 이 사실을 보고하면서 ‘나는 이에 대해 (한국 정부에) 항의하려 한다. 나는 국민들을 이렇게 다루는 조직과 일하고 싶지 않다’고 했다. 그때 워싱턴의 본부에서 온 메시지는 이랬다.‘그들(중정)로부터 한국인을 구하려 애쓰지마라. 너의 임무는 사실을 보고하는 것 뿐이다’라고.”   - 그러나 당신은 박종규 경호실장에게 ‘이후락 부장과 더이상 같이 일할 수 없다’고 항의하지 않았나?   “그렇다. 나는 명령을 어겼다. 나는 박종규 경호실장에게 갔다. 나는 박 실장이 남자다워서 좋아했고, 박 실장이 이후락을 싫어하는 것도 알고 있었기 때문이다. 나는 박 실장에게 ‘내가 상부의 어떤 승인이나 지시를 받고 얘기하는 건 아니다. 다만 내 심정이다. 최 교수에게 무슨 일이 벌어졌는지 나도 알고, 당신도 안다. 중정의 일이다. 나는 북한에 맞서 중정을 돕기 위해 한국에 왔다. 그런데 나는 중정은 북한에 대해 일하기보단, 박정희 정권의 반대세력을 억누르는데만 골몰한다. 나는 이런 식의 관계가 매우 불편하다’고 말했다. 그때 박종규는 이를 메모했다. 표정이 매우 진지했다. 그리고 나는 내 사무실로 돌아와 기다렸다. 1주일 뒤, 이후락이 경질됐다. 이후락은 이후 한국을 떠나 카리브해(영국령 바하마)로 도망갔고, 박 정권이 그를 찾아내 다시 한국으로 불러들였다.”   - 박 대통령이 그 모든 것에 관여했나?   “물론이다. 이후락의 뒤를 이어 신직수 전 법무장관이 중앙정보부장이 되었다. 그는 내게 말하길 ‘나는 이 정부에 저항하면서 불법행위를 하는 사람들에게 강경하게 하는 것과 동시에 이 정부를 지지하면서 불법행위를 일삼는 사람들에게 똑같이 강경하게 대처하겠다’고 했다. 신직수는 중정에 ‘고문을 중지하라’는 내부명령을 내렸다.”   - 그러나 이후락이 물러났지만, 1974년 민청학련 사건, 1975년 긴급조치 9호 등 오히려 유신정권의 독재체제는 더 강화됐고, 73년 그때보다 더 많은 사람들이 민주화운동으로 인해 감옥에 갔다.   “맞다. 그러나 그건 한국인들의 민주주의에 대한 열망이 점점 강해졌기 때문인 것으로 본다. 그러나 적어도 이후락이 떠나고, 신직수가 (중앙정보부장으로) 들어온 뒤로 중앙정보부는 확실히 바뀌었다. 박정희는 미국과의 관계를 위해 자신의 2인자인 이후락을 기꺼이 제거할 정도로 정치적 감각이 뛰어난 인물이었다.”　   » 도널드 그레그 “미국은 박정희의 반공 때문에 5·16 안막아” 당시 미국 외교정책은 냉전의 관점에서 상황을 봤다. 그러나 김대중을 구한 건 정적을 살해하는 정부와 관계를 유지하고 싶지는 않았기 때문이다. ■ 박정희의 핵개발   - 그러나 박정희는 그즈음 핵개발 시도로 인해 미국과의 관계가 악화된 것 아닌가?   “한국은 10년간 미국의 요청으로 베트남전에 참전했다. 한국은 베트남전을 통해 미국으로부터 얻은 외화로 새마을운동을 벌이는 등 경제발전을 위한 ‘시드머니’로 활용했다. 그러나 또하나 베트남이 무너지면, 도미노처럼 공산화가 번져 한국도 위험하다고 봤던 것도 한국의 베트남전 참전의 한 이유였다. 그런데 내가 1973년 한국에 왔을 그때, 미군은 베트남에서 철수했다. 박정희는 이걸 보면서 미국과의 동맹에 대한 믿음을 잃기 시작했다. 그가 핵개발에 나선 이유다”   - 핵개발 시도가 당시 한-미 관계 악화의 주원인이었나?   “물론이다. 박정희는 ‘나는 베트남에 30만명을 보냈다. 그런데 미국을 믿을 수 없다. 우리 스스로 우리를 지켜야 한다’고 생각했을 것이다. 1970년대 동북아시아에 비밀리에 핵무기를 개발하고, 국민들을 고문하는 나라가 있었다. 사람들은 북한이라고 생각할 것이다. 아니다. 그건 남한이다. 1970년대의 남한과 오늘날의 북한은 여러 점에서 흡사하다.”   - 박정희가 핵무기를 개발에 착수한 시점이 언제인가?   “대략 1972년 무렵이다.”   - 미국이 곧바로 그 사실을 알았나?   “아니다.”   - 언제 그 사실을 알게 됐나?   “1973년이다.”   - 어떻게 알게 됐나?   “그건 말하기 곤란하다.”   - 그래서 어떻게 했나?   “그걸(핵무기 개발을) 멈추게 했다. 나는 본국에 (한국의 핵무기 개발 추진을) 보고했고, 미 정부는 매우 조심스럽게 이를 멈추도록 한국 정부에 요구했다. 2011년 북한에 대해 미국이 핵개발 억제를 위해 애쓰는 것과 똑같았다.”   - 박정희를 어떻게 설득했나?   “우리가 북한으로부터의 어떠한 공격에도 남한을 보호할 것이며, 따라서 남한이 핵무기를 지닐 필요가 없다는 것을 강하게 재확인시켰다.”   - 그래서 그가 포기했나?   “그렇다.”   - 언제?   “몇 년 뒤, 1977년 무렵이다.”   - 미국이 한국을 보호하겠다고 했지만, 이후 지미 카터 대통령은 미군 철수를 공언했다.   “그렇다. 그건 카터의 잘못이다.”   - 핵을 포기했는데, 카터는 왜 박정희를 싫어했나?   “박정희는 독재자였다. 이는 (인권을 중시하는) 카터와는 잘 맞지 않는다. 또 카터는 박정희가 핵무기를 개발하려 했다는 것도 잘 알고 있었다.”   - 카터가 미군 철수를 계획하자, 박정희는 다시 비밀리에 핵개발을 시도했고, 이때문에 미 중앙정보국이 김재규를 시켜 박정희를 암살케 했다는 루머가 한국사회에 오랫동안 떠돌았다.   “말도 안된다. 넌센스다.”   ■ 물러나려 했던 박정희? “당시 박정희는 경호실장 차지철과 술을 많이 마셨다. 아마 김재규는 차지철이 박정희에게 나쁜 영향을 미친다고 생각했다. 그러나 내가 이해할 수 없는 것은 김재규가 왜 박정희를 쏘았냐 하는 점이다. 그 마지막 술자리에서 차지철이 김재규를 자극했고, 그래서 김재규가 차지철을 쏘았을 것이다. ”   - 그렇다면 10.26이 돌발적으로 일어났다는 뜻인가?   “내가 설명할 수 있는 건 그게 전부다.”   - 미국은 박정희 정권 내부에서의 암살 가능성을 예견했나?   “전혀 아니다.”   - 1976년 당신은 텍사스대 연설에서 ‘박정희가 다음 선거에서 당선되더라도, 그가 그 임기를 마치지 못할 것이다’고 했다. 그건 무슨 뜻으로 한 말인가?   “나는 박정희가 다음번 선거에 나서지 말아야 한다는 생각을 하고 있었다. 또 그러기를 바랐다. 당시 한국 국민들의 민주화 요구는 점점 커져갔고, 박정희에 대해 지쳐있었다. 또한번의 임기 연장은 사회를 더욱 불안하게 만들 수 있고, 그 경우, 예상할 수 있는 가능성은 또한번의 쿠데타 또는 암살이다. 나는 나의 예감이 적중한 것에 대해 유감스럽게 생각한다. 그래서 나는 다음번 선거(1978년)에는 박정희가 나서지 않을 수도 있다고 봤다.”   - 76년 무렵, 미 중앙정보국이 한국의 쿠데타 시도를 박정희 정권에게 전했다는 이야기가 있다.   “금시초문이다. 그것에 대해 들은 바 없다.”   - 그럼 박정희가 물러나려 했다고 생각한 구체적 이유가 있나?   “박정희는 1974년 부인 육영수씨가 숨진 뒤, 물러날 생각을 했던 것으로 안다. 그해 가을 서울 북쪽에 있는 한양 골프장에서 박정희와 함께 골프를 칠 기회가 있었다. 처음이자 마지막이었다. 11월 제럴드 포드 대통령과 헨리 키신저 국무장관이 온 직후였다. 당시 소련 블라디보스톡을 방문한 뒤 서울에 온 포드는 ‘미국은 한국을 북한과 소련으로부터 충분히 지켜낼 것이다. 우리의 동맹관계에 대해 염려하지 마라’는 메시지를 전하기 위해 왔다. 박정희는 상당히 만족했고, 우리를 골프행사에 초청했고, 골프가 끝난 뒤 저녁식사를 함께 했다. 그 자리에는 국방장관 등 고위인사들이 함께 참석했다. 그런데 다들 육군사관생도처럼 바짝 긴장한 채 술을 마셨다. 박정희가 말을 안 하면, 아무도 말을 꺼내는 이가 없었다. 그래서 내가 박정희에게 이렇게 말했다. ‘각하께서 터키의 케말파샤와 비교된다는 걸 아십니까?’라고. 그러자 박정희가 나한테 ‘이 친구가 지금 뭘 말하려는거야? 나는 케말파샤에 대해 잘 모른다. 그러나 나는 그가 터키를 경제적으로 강하고, 군사적으로 안전하게 만든 것처럼 나도 한국에서 그렇게 하길 원한다. 그러나 나는 (케말파샤처럼) 죽을 때까지 대통령직에 영원히 있진 않겠다. 어쩌면 나는 이미 너무 오랫동안 이 자리에 있는지도 모른다. 만일 지난번(1972년)에 대통령에 나서지 않았다면, 내 처는 아직도 살아있었을텐데’라고 말했다. 그 자리에 있던 우리 모두는 ‘아, 박정희가 다음 대선(1978년)에는 안 나올 수도 있겠구나’라고 생각했다.”   - 그러나 그는 (1978년 체육관 선거를 거쳐) 9대 대통령에 또 취임했다.   “그렇다. 아마 차지철이 ‘각하, 안 됩니다. 각하만이 대한민국을 지킬 수 있습니다’라며 강하게 만류했을 것이다. 차지철 외에도 박정희 주변 사람들 상당수가 그렇게 했을 것이다.”   - 박정희가 지쳤던 것인가?   “그렇다. 만일 그때 박정희가 스스로 물러났다면, 그는 지금보다 훨씬 더 존경받았을 것이다. 그리고 그랬다면 전두환은 없었을 것이고, 한국의 민주주의도 훨씬 빨리 이뤄졌을 것이다.”   - 박정희는 김종필에게 정권을 물려주려 했던건가?   “아마도. 김종필은 내가 알기에 3김 중 정치적 감각이 가장 뛰어난 인물이다. 김대중은 더 넓은 비전을 가졌지만, 정치적인 영민함은 김종필이 우위였다. 만일 김종필이 박정희를 이어 대통령이 됐다면 한국에 민주주의를 가져오는, 매우 뛰어난 대통령이 됐을 것이다.”   ■ 박근혜   “재미있는 이야길 하나 하겠다. 2001년 임동원 국가정보원장이 평양을 방문해 김정일 국방위원장을 만났을 때의 이야기다. 김정일은 그때 임 원장에게 ‘내가 인터넷으로 매일 남한 뉴스를 본다. 또 청와대 웹사이트도 흥미롭게 본다. 청와대 웹사이트에서 본 대통령 이야기 중 나는 박정희에 대해 제일 감명깊게 읽었다. 북한에도 박정희와 같이 경제발전을 이룩해낼 사람이 필요하다. 나는 박정희가 남한에서 이룩한 일에 대해 깊이 존경한다. 그런데 따님 박근혜씨가 정치를 하고 있는 것으로 안다. 박근혜씨가 북한을 방문해주면 좋겠다’고 말했다. 임 원장은 이런 뜻을 박근혜씨에게 전했고, 박근혜씨가 이를 받아들여 2002년 북한을 방문했다.”   - 박근혜 전 한나라당 대표는 김정일 위원장에게 무얼 이야기했나?   “정확히는 모른다. 그러나 2002년 월드컵 경기장에서 박 전 대표를 만나 북한에 갔다온 것을 축하한다고 말하자, 박 전 대표는 ‘우리는 과거의 아픈 기억이 아니라, 낙관을 갖고 미래를 봐야한다’고 말했다. 깊은 인상을 받았다. 그는 아버지의 영민함과 어머니의 부드러움을 다 물려받았다.”   - 일각에서는 박근혜가 대통령이 되는 것은 과거회귀라는 주장도 한다.   “나는 그렇게 생각하지 않는다. 그는 아버지의 유산을 물려 받았지만, 아버지와는 아주 다른 인물이다. 나는 오늘날 한국정치에서 그녀가 매우 건설적인 역할을 한다고 생각한다.”     ■ 박정희에 대한 평가   - 박근혜 전 대표가 대통령이 되면, 박정희에 대한 평가도 달라질까?   “이미 변하고 있다. 내가 1951년 한국전쟁 당시 조지아주 공군기지에서 낙하산 훈련을 받을 때였다. 훈련소 부근의 맥주집에 코미디언이 만담을 하곤 했다. 당시 군인들을 상대로 코미디언은 ‘당신 앞에 3가지 질환이 놓여있고, 그중 하나를 택해야 한다. 어느 걸 택하겠느냐? 매독, 임질, 그리고 한국행’이라고 말했고, 우린 모두 웃었다. 한국은 당시 우리들에게 그 정도로 인식됐다. 그런데 나는 지난해 바로 그 조지아주의 기아자동차 공장에 갔다왔다. 조지아주 주지사가 그 자리에 있던 정몽구 현대·기아자동차 회장에게 ‘조지아에 공장을 세워줘 고맙다. 이 공장은 조지아주 역사상 가장 큰 발전을 가져왔다’고 말했다. 그만큼 한국은 발전했다. 박정희는 그러한 한국의 발전에 상당한 기여를 했다. 나는 지금까지 한국의 가장 뛰어난 대통령 3명을 꼽으라면, 박정희 노태우 김대중을 든다. 노태우는 상대적으로 저평가돼 있지만.”   - 그러나 한국의 30~40대에게서 박정희는 나라를 발전시킨 대통령보다 독재자로 더 많이 인식되고 있다. 50대 이상은 또 다르게 생각하겠지만.   “그렇다. 나도 박정희가 그 두 가지 측면을 다 갖고 있는 것으로 보고 있다. 그러나 나는 박정희에 대해 깊은 존경심을 갖고 있다. 나는 그의 판단력, 전략적 감각, 한국의 경제발전, 그의 실용적 측면 등을 모두 존중한다.”　   - 개발도상국에서는 ‘선 경제발전-후 민주화’라는 주장을 하는 학자들이 있다. 당신도 그런 견해를 갖고 있나?   “나는 경제와 민주주의가 완전히 분리된 것이라고 생각하지 않는다. 1987년 직접선거가 시행됐고, 이후 한국의 민주화가 가속화됐다. 나는 그 이유가 경제발전이 있었기 때문에 가능하다고 본다. 북한의 경우도 마찬가지다. 북한이 경제적으로 발전한다면, 북한도 (국제적인) 고립에서 나오게 될 것이며, 북한 주민들을 더 낫게 대우할 것이다. 내가 북한에 대한 경제지원에 관심이 있는 이유도 그때문이다.”   아몽크(뉴욕주)/글·사진 권태호 특파원 ho@hani.co.kr   ■ 그레그는 1973~76년 한국CIA 맡아 주한 미국대사로 일하기도 도널드 그레그(83)는 30년간 미국 중앙정보국(CIA)에서 일했다. 1951년부터 미 중앙정보국 생활을 시작해 70년대 초까지 사이판, 미얀마, 일본 등 주로 동아시아에서 일했다. 한국전쟁에 참전했고, 70~72년에는 베트남전에도 관여했다. 73~76년 미 중앙정보국 한국지부 총책임자로 있으면서 유신정권의 상황을 지켜봤다. 79~81년 국가안보회의(NSC) 참모로 일했고, 82~88년에는 로널드 레이건 대통령의 안보담당 보좌관을 역임했다. 89년 조지 부시 대통령에 의해 당시 노태우 정부의 주한 미국대사로 임명돼 93년까지 대사로 있었다. 2009년 8월까지 한·미 양국간 이해증진을 목표로 한 비영리단체인 코리아소사이어티 회장을 맡았다.       ■ 인터뷰 후기 “한국분단, 미국 책임 상당…미안합니다” 도널드 그레그 전 대사는 현재 뉴욕시 북쪽의 아몽크라는 오래된 시골마을에 아내와 단둘이 조용히 지내고 있다. 소박한 그의 집은 주한 미국대사를 마치고 귀국하면서 장인·장모의 집을 물려받은 것이다. 1845년에 지어진 이 집은 그의 아내가 태어나 어린 시절을 보낸 곳이기도 하다. 그레그 전 대사는 2시간여의 인터뷰가 끝난 뒤, 한국에 있을 당시 수집했던 도자기, 고서화 등을 보여주기도 했다. 그는 오랜 중앙정보국(CIA) 요원 생활을 했고, 주로 공화당 정부에서 요직을 맡았지만, 이데올로기적 관점에선 상당히 자유로웠다. 그는 “사람들은 시아이에이 요원들은 대개 우파일 것이라 생각하지만, 시아이에이는 사실(fact)이 뭔지 캐내는 사람이다. 장막 뒤의 실체를 파악하기 위해 애쓰는 것”이라며 시아이에이에 대한 강한 자부심을 드러냈다. 그는 한국에 대해 “한국의 분단에는 미국에 상당한 책임이 있다”며 한국말로 ‘미안합니다’라고 말하며 자신이 한국에 계속 관심을 갖는 이유 중의 하나라고 설명했다. 그레그 전 대사는 지난해 천안함 침몰이 북한의 피습이 아닌, 사고일 가능성이 높다고 주장해 관심을 모았다. 인터뷰 말미에 이를 묻자, “나는 천안함 침몰이 북한의 소행이 아니라고 본다. 여기에 대해 얘기하려면 또 이번만큼의 장시간 인터뷰를 해야 할 것”이라고 말했다. Former Ambassador Donald Gregg discusses Park Chung-hee’s legacy Interview with Donald P. Gregg, Former Chairman of the Board of The Korea Society, Ambassador to South Korea and CIA Korea Chapter director 　 » Former Ambassador to South Korea Donald Gregg displays Joseon-era pottery he purchased in Seoul’s Insa-dong in 1968. (Photo by Kwon Tae-ho) By Kwon Tae-ho, Washington Correspondent　 　 Hankyoreh: I’d like to ask you about the Coup. Before 1961, the U.S. didn’t capture any sign of a military coup? Donald Gregg: “I remember that Chang Myun was a Prime Minister, after Seung-Man Rhee. And the U.S. was very hopeful about him. I was in Japan at that time, and there was a lot of optimism about Chang Myun. He was going to be very different from Seung-Man Rhee. He was going to move South Korea toward democracy. we were very optimistic. Here was a new chapter in Korean history. But he was not particularly effective in dealing with the situation. And I think it was not too much of a surprise when the prime minister.. when Park Chung-hee overthrew him.” Did you now Park Chung-hee before? “No, I never met him. First time I met him was 1973. But I was in Japan and we were very interested in what’s happening in Korea and so on. So.. I think they were having mixed feelings about Park Chung-hee coming in. He‘d been trained by the Japanese; he was fluent in Japanese; there were some who worried that he might even be a leftist; there was confusion about what he was. But it soon became clear that he was a very strong leader; that he had a vision of what he wanted Korea to become; and he began to push development in Korea, economic development, the Saemaeul movement trying to reform agriculture. So we soon saw him as a very powerful leader with, as you pointed out, a dictatorial side, but also a very entrepreneurial side. And so we were very interested to watch his development. And I first visited Korea in 1968, and was just there for 3 or 4 days. And I was very impressed with what I saw; the economic development was just just beginning. They were just beginning to make hot water boilers, faucets, sort of low tech thing. But the sense of energy and the sense of drive was very clear. And so for the only time in my CIA career, I asked to be sent to Korea. And I was sent there five years later in 1973. When I arrived there in 1973, the president Park was firmly in control; the industrial development was beginning; Hyundai was building its first dry dock, its first ship at the same time; Posco steel was beginning to build steel; Lucky Goldstar was beginning to build television sets.” 1973 was very, very different from 1968, even though only five years passed. “Completely. Completely different. And people he selected, Park Taejun at Posco, Jung Jooyoung at Hyundai, Samsung’s Lee Byungchul, and Nam Dukwoo at Finance, brilliant wonderful man. So he chose his people really well. And he gave them support, he got them land, he got them financing, he got them all kinds of elbow room so that they could really drive these projects forward. And it was very impressive.” But some say that even though in 1960s Park pushed the economic development, over 1970s the speed was very high because he had to prove the validity of the October Yushin in the economic development. “Well. I was talking about his good side, the people, particularly, Nam Dukwoo, Park Taejun, and Jung Jooyoung, I didn’t know Lee Byungchul, but a friend of mine worked for him and said he was a terrific leader. That was a good side. on a down side, he had Lee Hoorak, and people like Dongsun Park. That was the symbol of the Korean Yin-Yang. Dongsun Park. He was sent to the U.S with a lot of money, tried to buy American support in Congress, Dongsun Park.” Korea-gate occured in 1977, I think. “Yeah, Korea-gate came later. But it was already started. So, I arrived in July of 1973, as the chief of station of CIA. And Philip Habib was Ambassador. A wonderful ambassador, very tough, very smart. He said, ‘there’s only one rule I have for you. You will not meet ever with Dongsun Park, ever, never. Don’t have anything to do with him.’ He said he’s corrupt, he’s trying to corrupt us, he’s gonna try to influence you. Just have nothing to do with him. That’s the only rule.” At that time, wasn’t he in the U.S., Dongsun Park? “No, he was .. well I think he was going back and forth. So then, I went to see Lee Hoorak, and he had a huge office. It was on top of the buiding right across the Ambassy.” Was it a secret office of KCIA? “No, I don’t know. Nothing secret about it. And anyway, I went to see him. Somebody was taking picture when I came in, 5 or 6 guys were sitting around. I felt I was meeting with a Prime Minister.” Bigger than the President’s office? “Yes! And so.. I didn’t like him. And I didn’t like what the KCIA was at that time. I thought it was a very dangerous organization. I know about Intelligence work, and if an intelligence agency thinks its chief job is to keep down the public opposition.” They focused on the domestic issues only? “That’s right. Then, it’s what I called ‘polemical’ intelligence agency. It wasn’t interested in the facts. It was interested in keeping political border. So in my first meeting with Lee Hoorak, I said, ‘well, how did you feel when you went to Pyungyang and met with your life-long enemy Kim Ilsung?’ I think it was 1972 (before October Yooshin). And he said, he broke into English, suddenly, ‘oh, very strong, one man rule, quite a guy, quite a guy.’ So I thought, instead of, I thought he would say ‘I wanted to pull out a pistol and shoot him.’ Not at all. It was admiration for the amount of control he had. And so I have always thought that the roots of Yooshin came through his interpretation, Lee Hoorak’s interpretation of what he had seen in Pyongyang. And he had said to president Park ‘if we are going to open up a dialogue with them, we have to be as strongly in control in South Korea as he is in North Korea.’ And I think that led to Yushin. They were also afraid of Kim Dae-jung. Because in the presidential election of 1971, they just beat Kim Dae-jung by very few percentage points.” There was even the possibility that DJ had in fact won. It is a possibility, I think. “Well, but it was very close. And I had heard before I came to Korea, Kim Dae-jung was in the U.S. and he was protesting Yushin, and he was saying it’s wrong, it’s undemocratic, it keeps fair elections from being held. And there were already some signs at the meetings Kim Dae-jung was having at the U.S. that there were protests, sort of you know. So I had already in my mind that Kim Daejung was a cause of worry to Park Junghee and to Lee Hoorak, because the election was very close; he was regarded as much too liberal; and they were worried about it. So that was my introduction to Lee Hoorak. And then in August of that year, 1973.” The abduction. “The abduction. Habib called me into his office and said ‘Kim Dae-jung has been kidnapped from his hotel room in Tokyo’ and he said ‘I know how things work around here, they’re going to kill him, but they may wait until they see what I have to say; so if you can tell me by tomorrow morning where he is and who has him, maybe we can keep him alive.’ And so I was able to tell him the next morning where he was; he was in a boat, tied hand and foot, with weights around his legs, he’d been pushed around and treated very roughly, and he knew he was going to be thrown into sea.” How did Habib know about the abduction of DJ? “I think he heard from Japanese police.” The Japanese police sent the information to Habib? “Yes, and he then called me.” And did the Japanese police know that the abduction was by Koreans? “They didn’t know who it was. I think they suspected, but they didn’t know.” Just speculation. Probably by Korean. “Probably, but he didn’t tell me... He just said ‘He’s been kidnapped.’ He could have been kidnapped by the Korean government, but all the information we have now is that he’s been kidnapped, and other parts of the situation you should investigate. We should know until tomorrow morning. So.. when I think Habib suspected that it had been by the KCIA. And so I was able to tell him the next day that KCIA had kidnapped him and that he was on a boat, on the straits of Tsushima. That’s where he was. So I told Habib that, and then he said ‘Good, thank you.’ And that was all. And he said ‘I will take care of that.’ And so for years, I thought he had jumped in his car and gone to Blue House with this information, but he didn’t do that.” Habib probably met with President Park. “He did not.” Some reports were published saying Habib met Park. “That’s wrong. He sent a letter. I often talked to college students who are interested in becoming diplomats, and I say ‘You are Habib, and you have this information and you need to get it to the president, how do you do it?’ And almost all of them say ‘Oh, I jump in the car and go see the president’ but Habib was smarter than that. Because he realized that there was tremendous problem of face involved in this. If he went to Blue House, the blue house didn‘t exist at that point, but anyway, and he was to say ‘President Park, your Korean CIA has kidnapped Kim Daejung, and you must not kill him’ then suddenly what would Park do? Prabably he would said he didn’t know. “Yeah, that’s probably what Park would say. But by sending a letter, he gave Park a chance to think through what he was going to do. He knew Park well. And he sent, he signaled Blue House that there is an important letter I have for President Park and he must see it. So the letter was sent.” Was it because Habib thought that Park had ordered it? “I don’t know about that. But he knew that the only way to keep Kim Daejung from being killed was to get President Park become involved. That was the surest way to keep Kim Daejung alive. To go to the KCIA would... you know... nothing... would have worked out.” Then who ordered the abduction? Lee Hoorak or Park Chung-hee? “Well, I will get to that later. I thought that Park and Lee Hoorak used to go out drinking together, and I thought that one night Park got drunk and said ‘That son of bitch Kim Daejung, I wish somebody would take care of him’ something like that and that Hoorak Lee said ‘A-ha, I think I know what he wants.’ So he did it on his more or less on his own. I asked Kim Dae-jung a year before he died. I saw quite a lot of him. I said ‘What happened? Was this Lee Hoorak‘s decision?’ and he said, ‘No, Park Chung-hee ordered my kidnapping.’ That was what Kim Daejung told me. That was just my idea. The reason why I say that is that in my country, the Kennedys, the Kennedy president hated Fidel Castro. And Dick Helms was the head of American CIA. In his book, he wrote going in to see Kennedy. And Kennedy did not say in so many ways ‘kill Castro’ But as Helms said, ‘I felt he put an arrow in my quiver, and I knew what he wanted.’ So I thought that kind of thing may have happened in Korea. But Kim Daejung told me he believed that Park Chung-hee had ordered the KCIA to kidnap him and kill him. But you know, that was Kim Daejung’s opinion. So by sending the letter, Habib gave Park a chance to decide how to handle this. So his decision was you know some rogue elements in KCIA without orders had done this and very glad that Kim Daejung is alive. And you know his face is saved. And Lee Hoorak’s face was saved. And so... things went on a little time until riots broke out in college campuses when a word got out that KCIA had kidnapped Kim Daejung. I will tell you about that. So the KCIA arrested an American-trained Professor Choi.” Yeah, Jongkil Choi. “Yeah, from Seoul National University and accused him of having stirred up these riots on the SNU campus. And they took him to their special awful dwelling, I forgot where it was, where they conducted their interrogation. They may have tortured him to try to make him confess. And we don’t know whether they tortured him to death and threw his body out of the window or whether he jumped out the window to try to escape from further torture. We don’t know. But we know he was tortured and that his body went out of the window.” How did you know Choi was tortured? Did the CIA check his body? “No. But that is the job of... an intelligence organization doesn’t trust another intelligence organization. You try to find out what they are doing, to keep them from doing terrible stupid things. So I wouldn’t say more than that. But we knew what happened.” You believe Professor Choi died from the torture. “Yes.” By the KCIA? “Yes. Then I reported this to my headquarters and I sent another message. I said ‘I want to protest this, because I am completely against torture, and I do not want to have dealings with an organization that does that to its own people. I want to protest.’ So I got a message back from my boss, in CIA in Washington, he’s now dead, but he said ‘Stop trying to save Koreans from themselves; your job is just report the facts.’ So I was told not to protest.” I heard that you remonstrated the guard Park Jongkyu, and Lee Hoorak. “Yes.” And I heard that you said ‘I wouldn’t work with Lee as long as Lee is in his position, the head of KCIA. Was it voluntary or ordered by the CIA?’ “No, I disobeyed orders. I like Park Jongkyu. Do you speak Japanese at all? He’s sort of Samurai type of guy. And I liked him. And I know he hated Lee Hoorak.” Often times, the president’s security team and the KCIA were not on good terms. “That’s right. We have the same thing in the U.S. The FBI and CIA don’t get along well. So, I went to him. And I said ‘I do not have any authorization to say what I am going to say to you. This is just my gi-bun, feeling. And I have a very bad feeling about what happened to Professor Choi.’ And I said ‘I know what happened to him, you know what happened to him, and that kind of thing should not happen. That’s not KCIA’s job, I am here to help KCIA deal with North Korea. That’s what we have in common, and here I am to find that KCIA is more interested in keeping down opposition to Park Junghee than it is working against North Korea. And I am very uncomfortable with this relationship.’ And that’s all I said. Park Jongkyu took notes and he looked very sober. And I went back to my office and waited. And about a week later, Lee Hoorak was fired.” Oh, after a week? It was power of the KCIA then. “He fled Korea and I think they found him hiding in Caribbean. They brought him back and put in jail. Anyways.” Probably president Park did something about it? “Of course! Of course! So then, most importantly, I was called in by Shin Chiksoo, who was new KCIA director, and he was the former Justice Minister. And he said to me, ‘Mr. Greg, I am going to be as hard on people who break the law in support of this government as I am going to be hard on those who break the law against this government.’ And then we heard that his next official internal order is to stop torture.” After Lee Hoorak, 1975, anybody could oppose the October Yushin, which meant a more powerful dictatorship. In 1973, the dictatorship was strong. But in 1975, so many people were arrested because they were pro-democracy. “I think that’s right. I think things got worse because the desire of Korean people to have democracy became stronger. That’s what happened. But at least when Hoorak Lee went, Shin Chiksoo followed him, and he was a much better director. He brought in people like Hyun Hongjoo, who was one of the leading lawyers in Korea, of Kim & Chang. He was educated in Columbia University. And he’s completely different person. And so at least for the time, the change from Lee Hoorak to Shin Chiksoo was a positive thing.” The direction of KCIA after Lee Hoorak has changed? “Completely.” Even though the protests became more severe? “Later on. Yes.” Let’s come back to coup in 1961. Park called the coup a military revolution to protect South Korea because South Korea was vulnerable to the North’s invasion in 1961. How did the U.S. assess that part, in terms of the relationship with North Korea? The Chang Myun regime was so optimistic, you said. But the public education that I got emphasized the insecurity of the society in 1961, so many demonstrations and labor unions and university students wanted to do something for reunion. And teachers in public education system resonated the point saying ‘the military revolution was necessary.’ I didn’t know the details of the coup very well, because they were not taught in schools. Then, what was the U.S. assessment of the situation of the moment? What would have happened, you thought, if there had not been Park’s coup? “I think what we tend to forget was that when the Korean peninsula was divided by the United States, mi an hab ni da, I am sorry, but North Korea was much more powerful than South Korea, in the 1950s.” Militarily? Or Economically? “Both. I mean the Italian peninsula and Korean peninsula are about the same. In the north, there are mountains, water power, mineral resources, manufacturing...” Industrialized. “Industrialized. But the south is a breadbasket. So the fear in South Korea of North Korean invasion was very, very strong. And because there is still fear of that invasion, Kim Ilsung was well established as leader, he had strong support still from the Soviet Union, and so the fear of the North Korea was very powerful in 1960s. And still in 1970s when tunnels were dug under the DMZ, and the Blue House raid in 1968, and the seizure of the Pueblo in 1968. So in the early 1960s.” Do you think Kim Il-sung tried to invade again in 1960s? “I don’t think there was an actual plan. But the fear of it was there. And so I think that Chang Myun was very optimistic, open and democratic. And so the fear was that he was much too liberal, he‘s not tough enough, the North will take advantage of this, and it’ll lead to subversion and the South will lose. And I think it motivated Park Junghee. And I think a lot of people felt that Chang Myun was too nice a guy, was ineffective, too liberal. And I think that’s what motivated Park Chung-hee.” Too nice and ineffective. You mean naive? “Yes, that’s how he felt I think. And right along, we had to go back. You know, you don’t know. That’s a job for scholars to say ‘If we learn more about North Korea at that time, what would have happened?’ We don’t know. The fear was there. I sensed that when I visited in 1968. The fear was there in 1973. There was a curfew every night at 12 o’clock. In golf courses, they put long poles in fairways to keep the North Korean airplanes from secretly landing with infiltrators. So the fear of the North was very strong. Very strong. And I think that’s what motivated Park Chung-hee, who was a very tough guy. And there was a tremendous fear, even more there. Because the fear around the DMZ and infiltrators and spies and sabotage and those kinds of things. A great fear. And he felt he had to take over or things could get worse.” Some scholars insisted that democracy and economic development would have come into being anyways, even if Park hadn’t carried the coup out. However, because of his coup, the Korean society took a different route, a strange one: the economy only developed, while democracy was squashed. Would that mean a balanced development in economy and democracy could have been expected without his coup? “That’s a scholarly debate. And that’ll be debated for a long time.” So... what did the U.S. think? “I can’t really answer that. In 1961, I was in Japan and I wasn’t really working. I just heard indirectly about Korea. I think there was a disappointment that Chang Myun hadn’t worked out. I think that Park Junghee was seen as a fact that we had to deal with. But I wasn‘t really working on Korea at that point. I just can’t give you any more than that about what they were thinking. I am just saying ‘Why I think that Park Chung-hee was motivated to make that coup; because he felt the turmoil would continue and the North would take advantage of it. Maybe the forces of democracy would have emerged and Korea would have emerged. I don’t know. That’s something that scholars will debate and it’s a very interesting thing. But I am not a scholar, and I am telling you just what I remember.” Would it be plausible that the U.S. approved Park’s coup in a way, maybe because the Park regime would be pro-U.S. and anti-communism?. “I think there were probably two reactions within the U.S. one is disappointment that Chang Myun wasn’t effective, the disappointment by scholars and intellectuals. And the recognition by the Pentagon that a lot of benefits will come from Park Junghee that is anti-communist military leader, who would be more of a bullwork against subversion from the North Korea. I think there were both reactions.” Was President Kennedy concerned about the situation in Korea? “I think his main concern was Cuba, because in the beginning of his presidency, the Bay of Pigs was a disaster. And then in the fall of 1962 came the Cuban missile crisis, which was the world’s most dangerous moment. And so I don’t think he paid much attention to Korea. I think the general reaction was that Park Junghee is a tough general and anti-communist, he is a fact, he‘s taken power, and we’re not going to oppose it.” The U.S. might have not cared as far as the regime is anti-communist. The U.S. liked Park? “Well, I don’t know whether they liked him but I think they just accepted him that he is a fact and that it’s be counter-productive to have for him. I think the reaction in Korea and reaction in a number of countries at that time was to see the domestic situation in terms of the Cold War. Is the government pro-communist or anti-communist? So I think when he particularly took over, the decision as ok. Chang Myun, too bad, he was a head of this time, wasn’t strong enough, he’s been replaced now by somebody who is very strongly anti-communist, let’s... you know, there’s no use of fighting with him, let’s support him and see what he can do to develop the economy.” The viewpoint of the U.S. between 1960s and 1970s changed? “Yeah, I do remember how Seungman Rhee had run his course. And we were very grateful that somebody as democratically inclined as Chang Myun arrived in the scene. And there was disappointment that he didn’t succeed. So that was... Support for him psychologically, disappointment when he already failed, skepticism toward Park Chung-hee, then recognition that he’s a fact of life that we might as well work with him. That’s the best that I can say.” You said Park had given a notice before the October Yushin to North Korea, before he did to the U.S., according to the U.S. State of Department. Can that mean the North had approved it, if passively? “I don’t know. I can tell you that we felt that Yushin was a step in a wrong direction. We were encouraged by the decision to send Lee Hoorak to North Korea. We felt this was a start of perhaps a dialogue between the South and the North, which we were very interested in. and that’s what I have said earlier, one of the reasons why I didn‘t like Lee Hoorak was that when he came back, instead of saying ‘that’s a dictatorship up there, we are much stronger because we are not a dictatorship.’ His idea was we have to become more like North Korea in order to keep control, if we are going to talk to them.” They used the dialogue between the North and South as a dictatorship. “Right. The strength of Philip Habib’s reaction to Kim Dae-jung’s kidnapping was an indication to me how strongly we value what Kim Dae-jung stood for, because we knew he exemplified what Chang Myun had exemplified that this was... the side of Korea was pushing toward a greater democracy and that if he were killed by Park Chung-hee this would set back the evolution of democracy in the U.S. And we didn’t want to have a close relationship with a government that killed all its opponents. So we were very anxious to keep Kim Daejung alive because he represented what Chang Myun had represented.” Could that mean that the U.S. thought Kim would be an alternative to Park, maybe after Park? “Yes! Sure!” Did Park know that? “I think he probably feared it. I think he... the reason why he went to Yushin was that he feared if there’s another election, he might lose to Kim Daejung.” So President Park wanted to kill Kim. “Well, that’s what Kim Daejung told me just a year before he died.” Maybe he felt some kind of threat. “Yes, he certainly had felt a threat on the boat. He thought he was going to be killed right there, DJ did.” So... in saving Kim‘s life, Habib’s role was big, but not the U.S.’s role necessarily. “No, no, no, that’s not right. That’s absolutely not right. There was a great concern about Kim Daejung.” Oh, my question is if Habib sent the letter on his own or if it was ordered by the U.S. “Oh, no. Habib was in charge. He knew he had to move quickly. That‘s why I named the Ambassador’s House as Habib House. You had to move quickly, ’cause otherwise, Kim Dae-jung would be dead. And then not only it would have been the loss of Kim Dae-jung, but then what would we do in dealing with Park Chung-hee when we know that he killed him? What kind of... that would have made the relations with Park Chung-hee much more difficult. So by keeping Kim Daejung alive, we made it easier to continue our relationship with Park Chung-hee.” DJ might have been killed without your and Habib’s efforts? “Absolutely.” Some argue it was just a threat. “No, DJ told me that. He said ‘I have prayed and I was ready to die when I was on that boat.’ And then a plane flew over, he said, ‘it was a CIA plane’. ‘No,’ I said, ‘CIA didn’t have airplanes.’ I said ‘I think it’s one of two things: either a Japanese plane looking for you or a South Korean plane sending a signal to the boat ‘don’t kill him,’ because shortly after the plane flew over, he was untied, given something to... you know That’s why he thought it was a CIA plane. But it wasn’t. The point I want to make here is... I have great respect for Park Chung-hee. He was really smart. Now I want to go to what I was just talking about. When I protest to Park Jongkyu about KCIA, Park Jongkyu goes to Park Chung-hee. He says ‘Greg doesn’t like the KCIA. And he doesn’t like Lee Hoorak. And he doesn’t like what KCIA is doing.’ And there’s Park Chung-hee. What does he do about that? Would he fire Lee Hoorak? It shows how smart he was, because he knew by doing that, this would be evidence to the U.S. that he was willing to cooperate more closely with us to move Korea forward, both economically and politically. I mean Lee Hoorak was the 2nd most powerful man in Korea. And... there’s another interesting side to this story. And that’s the CIA side because I had been ordered not to say anything about the torturing to death of the professor Choi. ‘Stop trying to save Koreans from themselves.’ That’s what my boss told me. So I disobeyed him directly. And I went to Park Jongkyu and said ‘I don’t like him. I don’t like working with these guys.’” I think my boss was a very smart guy, the CIA boss in the U.S. He was a very smart guy. I didn’t like him. Very smart. Very tough. He never never said anything about this to me. Now, he was sitting there watching what‘s happening. He knows my gi bun, feeling, that I am unhappy. He told me ‘Don’t say anything.’ And he’s still watching. And suddenly he sees Lee Hoorak fired. And he says ‘Uh-oh, Greg disobeyed orders.’ Then he continues to watch, and he sees a new head of KCIA, Shin Chiksoo, completely different, who passes the rule against torture and things get much better. So he never ever said anything to me about my disobeying orders, and I never admitted that I disobeyed orders at that time. Why? Because things had turned out so well. Lee Hoorak is gone. A much better director of KCIA was in place. Torture has been forbidden. All good things. If my boss had criticized me, I would have said, ‘yeah, I disobeyed orders, and if I had followed your orders, none of these good things would have happened.’ So he never never held me accountable. Later on, when I was talking to senior officers in KCIA, I always told them “disobeyed orders, and you should do the same if you are ordered to do something that you know is wrong. Either disobey orders or quit.” And that was my choice. And I disobeyed orders. And I credit Park Junghee would be smart enough to realize in his long range of interest, to sacrifice Lee Hoorak for the sake of continuing good relations with the U.S.” Even though Park tried to continue good relations with the U.S. and his regime was anti-communist, the U.S. and Park didn’t get along so well. “No, they did not. And particularly when I got there, this is another very interesting aspect, because Park Junghee had sent 312,000 soldiers to help us fight in Vietnam. Two full divisions were there for 10 years. Now, we had paid the soldiers very well and the money they brought back helped economic development even at the village level. you know, we paid a lot of money to those troops. And their money came back to their pockets and their villages...” Right, it was something like seed money. “Seed money. Absolutely. But he had supported us because he believed in the Domino theory. He believed that if we lost in Vietnam, Thailand would collapse, Malaysia would collapse. So he was fighting communism in Vietnam. And suddenly he saw he‘s losing. So when I arrived in 1973, we had pulled out of Vietnam. And when I was in... He, Park Junghee had begun to lose faith in us as an ally. And that’s why he started the secret nuclear weapons program, because he lost faith in us.” Was it a nuclear weapons plan that made the U.S.-South Korea relations suffer? “Absolutely. Absolutely, because he thought ‘Jesus, I sent 300,000 Koreans to help these people in Vietnam and still they’re losing. And so they can’t be trusted. So I have to protect myself.’ I mean I started an article once saying ‘There is a country in 1970s in Northeast Asia that had a secret nuclear weapons program that was buying destabilizing weapons secretly and it‘s torturing its own people.’ And people would have said, ‘Oh, he’s talking about North Korea.’ No, I was talking about South Korea. And all of the things were going on at that time. South Koreans were doing in the 1970s what North Koreans are doing today. That’s why I think that the North Koreans aren’t so different from South Koreans. Why do we keep talking to North Koreans? That’s another long interview. The most important factor in U.S’s disliking Park was the nuclear weapon program? “No, I think... uh... I think we had mixed feelings toward him. We realized his terrific capacity, capabilities as a leader to push Korea‘s economic development. We recognized that respectfully. We were grateful to him for having sent troops to Vietnam. But he, on his part, had lost faith in us.” When did Park start developing nuclear weapons? “Uh... I would say about 1972” Did the U.S. know it right away? “No.” When did the U.S. come to know then? “When I was there.” In 1973? “Yes.” How did you know? “Well, I am not going into that.” What was your reaction? “Well, we stopped it. I reported the information and the U.S. government very carefully figured out the ways to stop it.” Some say Park’s secret nuclear weapon programs annoyed the U.S. “Yeah, we .. it was more than annoying because we are worried about nuclear proliferation. We were worried about nuclear proliferation in 1970s, just as we are worried about nuclear proliferation in North Korea in 2011. The same thing.” Why do you think Park tried to get nuclear weapons? “Because he didn’t trust us. He felt this was.. the way North Koreans do things. You have nuclear weapons and nobody dares to attack you. North Koreans were already saying to me “look at the mistake Ghadafi made, giving up his nuclear weapons.” Maybe Park didn’t trust the U.S. and wanted to protect South Korea. “That’s right, because he saw us losing in Vietnam.” How did the U.S. persuade Park? “Um.. there was just reaffirmation to him that we were reliable, that we would protect from North Korea from any attack from anybody, and he did not need nuclear weapons.” He gave up? “Yes.” When? “Maybe a couple of years later?” Before 1979? “Oh, yeah. In 1977” When Jimmy Carter came to Korea in 1979, though I was a young boy, I remember that Carter didn’t like Park. “That’s right.” Carter didn’t stay in a Korean hotel, he stayed at the U.S. army base, which shocked Koreans. “Well, Jimmy Carter wanted to withdraw the troops from South Korea. He ordered... There is a very great book about the Ambassador Glaistein. You’d want to read that book. That goes into that in exquisite details.” Why do you think Carter disliked Park? “I think he knew his background. He... you know, he was a dictator...” But Park gave up nuclears weapon in 1977. “But, Carter knew he tried to start a nuclear weapons program. I think he felt that this was a very strong dictatorial leader, so.. you know.. weren’t very good feelings between them.” When Jimmy Carter wanted to withdraw troops from Korea, all of the Koreans were afraid of that. “Yeah, it was a mistake on Carter’s play.” In a book I read, there was a description of Carter’s visit to the Blue House. He made clear that they’ll make announcement of their withdrawal of troops, and Park tried to persuade Carter persistently, which made Carter dislike Park all the more. “Yes.” The rumor goes... Because Park tried to develop nuclear weapons again after that Blue House summit with Carter, the U.S. ordered Kim Jaekyu to assassinate him. “Absolutely crazy. (laugh) No. I can’t get into that.” Did you hear about that? “No, I’ve never heard that before.” It’s a very prevalent rumor, especially in 1980s. “Bullshit. Just non-sense. The triggering factor was Cha Jeechul. Terrible.” What about Kim Jaekyu? “Uh.. I still don’t understand it. I knew him, I liked him. I played golf with him. I think what drove him to it was .. well.. we’re getting ahead of the story. Uh.. I want to tell you about the time I played golf with president Park. So let’s talk about that. Let’s move chronologically. OK? I think when the president Park’s wife was killed in 1974, he then withdrew as she was a wonderful woman. And he began to withdraw and went to a lot of drinking with Cha Jeechul.” After her death, maybe he was lonely. “Yes, and Cha Jeechul was very ambitious and I think Kim Jaekyu saw him as a dangerous influence. And the three of them were having dinner and there were uprisings in Southern region..” Busan and Masan in 1979. “Yes. So Cha Jeechul was saying to Park Jongkyu, to Park Junghee, that’s Kim Jaekyu’s fault. And Kim Jaekyu said, you know, ‘It’s not.’ According to the women there, he then told president Park ‘Why do you have such an insect as your close advisor?’ and pulled out his gun and killed him. And then the thing I never understand is why he pulled out a gun and shot Park.” I don’t understand either. It was very simple, very stupid. “Right. I think it was.. I didn’t realize he had such a temper. But Cha Jeechul is a miserable man. So I think he inflamed Kim Jaekyu and it means after Kim Jaekyu shot him, probably he went ‘oh my god.’” Was it an accident? “Crime of passion. That’s all I am going to explain.” Kim didn’t plan it out. “No, I don’t think he went to that meal intending to do it.” Did the U.S. foresee the possibility of assassination of Park by an inner circle? “No, absolutely no.” I want to talk about your address in 1976 in Texas. When you said, even if Park wins reelection, he wouldn‘t finish his 2nd term. What did you mean? “I felt that the South Korean people by that time had long tired of Park.” With uprisings, assassination possibility, or another coup, military coup? “Yeah, military coup, because I could sense already that people were getting tired of him. And that’s why I wanted to get to the golf game I had with him. Anyway, in the fall of 1974, Park invited Ambassador Dick Sneider, General Steelwell, and me, to play golf. North of Seoul. Hanyang? I think that’s the golf course north of Seoul. First and only time. And it followed the visit to Seoul of President Ford and Henry Kissinger. And that was a very important meeting, because it was reassuring to Park that the U.S. is still fully in support of him. They were on their way to Vladivostok for a meeting with the Soviet Union. And they stopped in Seoul. And I was in some of the meetings. And they went out of their way to say ‘The alliance is strong, we support you fully against North Korea, against the Soviet Union, don’t worry about us as your ally.’ That was a message. And so Park was feeling much better. And so he invited us to play golf. And I was very surprised to be invited, because I think he knew that I had done certain things. He knew that I protested to Park Jongkyu about Lee Hoorak. He knew that I had told to Park Jongkyu, ‘President Park needs a Minister of bad news.’ He said he doesn’t have anybody around him with the guts to tell him what he doesn’t want to hear, but what he needs to hear. And I said ‘Every strong leader needs a minister of bad news.’ I said that several times to Park Jongkyu. So I am sure he passed that onto president Park. So I was pleased to be included in this golf game. And I realized , while we were playing, I realized that Park Chung-hee had real sense of humor. And there was a chief Justice of Korea, who loved to play golf. But he had really funny-looking golf swing. And one time we were standing around one of the Ts, and president Park was saying ‘This is how the chief Justice swings his golf club.’ And he gave a very funny imitation of the chief Justice’s golf swing. And everybody laughed at that. And Park was not a particularly good golfer. And neither was I. And so... one time we both had hit the balls to the rough in the same direction. I spoke to president Park in Japanese, and that surprised him, because he didn’t know I spoke Japanese. And so we had a very friendly conversation in the rough as we were looking for our golf balls. So he was very friendly, very relaxed. And after the golf game we all had dinner. I just was amazed, because the Minister of Defense was there, and high ranking people were there. And they all sat sort of like this (gesturing) there, almost they looked like they were in a military academy drinking, you know.” Except Park. “Yeah, that’s right. He was very relaxed and so forth. And there was a long silence around the table that nobody was saying anything. I thought ‘What a waste of time!’ So I turned to Park, and said ‘Do you ever compare yourself to Kemal Ataturk in Turkey?’ And so he looked at me, ‘You’re very hard.. what’s this guy thinking this time anyway?’ and said, ‘I don’t know much about Kemal Pasha, but I’d like to do for Korea what he did for Turkey, and that is making it economically strong and militarily secure. But I am not going to stay in the presidency forever, and maybe I have already stayed too long and if I had not run for presidency last time, maybe my dear wife would be still alive.’ He said that. And we all thought ‘Ah! How interesting! That means he will not run for president again.’ In 1978? “Yes.” So that term was his last term, he thought. “Yes, but maybe Cha Jeechul had said ‘Oh, Mr. President, only you can save Korea!’ Cha Jeechul was thinking. In that time? In the golf meeting? “No no no, later. You know, Cha Jeechul knew that once park Junghee is gone, he is gone. So that’s the oldest funkies, they always have to say ‘Oh, you have to stay, only you can save us!’ like Mubarak.” By Cha Jeechul? “Yes. all others around him. All persuaded him. And so Park ran again. And that was just too much.” Park might have wanted to resign after 1978, and wanted to retire by handing the power over to other people? “Yes, I think so.” Maybe the president was tired too? “Of course he was tired. And if he had retired and was still alive, then probably he would be South Korea’s most honored citizen.” He might be respected, if he had resigned. “Absolutely. That’s what I had in mind in my Texas talk. but he stayed too long.” Park wanted to hand some power over Kim Jongpil? “Yes. And... I think of the three Kims, Jongpil was the smartest.” What about DJ? “DJ had broader vision.” You mean ‘smart politically’? “Yes. I knew JP. And I had great respect for him. He was brilliant guy. And it‘s too bad that... no... it would have been much better for Korea, if Park had retired in 1978 and made JP become president. He’d have been very smart very good president. ” You mean more democratic? “Yes. Much better than Chun Doo-hwan. Much better. But he stayed too long. Now I want to tell you another interesting story about Park. And this concerns Im Dongwon and Kim Jong-il. In 2011, one year after the summit, Im Dongwon was in Pyongyang, meeting with Kim Jong-il. And Kim Jungil said ‘I read the South Korean news everyday online, I‘m also very interested in the Blue House website, and on the Blue House website you have biographic sketch of all of your presidents. And I’ve read them all and one that is most impressive to me is Park Chung-hee.’ And Im Dongwon was surprised because he knew they tried to kill Park Junghee in 1968, the Blue House Raid. They tried to kill him in 1974 and killed his wife. So Im Dongwon said to Kim Jungil, ‘Oh that surprises me.’ And Kim says ‘We need somebody in North Korea to do Park did in South Korea in terms of stimulating economic development. And I very much admire the way he did that in South Korea. And I know there’s difficult history.’ But then he wound up saying that ‘his daughter is in politics, Park Keunhye, and I’d be very pleased if she would come to visit me in North Korea.’” That’s what Kim Jungil said to Im Dongwon in 2001? “Yes. Then Im Dongwon said ‘Well, I don’t know whether she will or not, but I will pass on your message to her.’ And he passed on his message to her and she went to North Korea as you know. And so at the opening of the World Cup in 2002, I was in Seoul for the opening game. And I saw Park Geun-hye at the stadium. And I had known her she was very young, I think, she was at Sogang University, a college student when I was there in the 1970s.” At that time, did you meet her? “Yes, not frequently, but you know. So anyway, I knew who she was, and I went up to her. And she knew who I was. And I said ‘I want to congratulate you for going to North Korea.’ I said ‘I think that was wonderful move. And her words I won’t forget. ‘We must look to the future with optimism, not to the past with bitterness.’ And I met her couple of times afterwards. She came to the U.S., she was invited by the Korea Society, and she gave a very good talk there. And then she went to Columbia University and she gave a good talk. And I am really impressed with Park Geun-hye. Really impressed with her, because I think she has inherited her father’s intelligence and her mother’s softness.” Intelligence, you mean political viewpoint? “Yes. But she also has the graciousness of her mother, who was just a lovely lovely person, very different from her father. So she’s inherited good things from both of her parents. So she is part of Park Chung-hee’s legacy to Korea today. And it’s very interesting to me that Kim Jungil who is a very intelligent man would read all about South Korea‘s presidents and say to Lim Dong-won ‘One that impressed me most was Park Chung-hee.’ That to me is very interesting.” Park Geun-hye is one of the leading candidates for president. But it’s also possible that her father will become a political trap for her. Anyone might say ‘You should answer this question: was your father a dictator or not?’ “Yeah, that‘s why this article you’re doing is so interesting, because if I were to be asked, who was the most important president in South Korea, the three in my mind: Park Chung-hee, Roh Tae-woo, and Kim Daejung. Yes, those three all did tremendous things for South Korea, in my view.” Roh Taewoo? “He is so underrated. What he accomplished as president was huge.” Because of his character. “Yes. And he also had a very smart advisor, Kim Jongwhee, who was National Security Advisor. He kept him for 5 years. I worked very closely with him. And that made a huge difference because usually they change every year or so, but Kim Jongwhee was for 5 years.” Some say that Park Geun-hye’s becoming president could mean stepping backwards to the 1970s. “No, I don’t think so. I heard her speak, she attracts... she brings very strong support from people who hear her talk, and she’s very different from her father.” You mean very different from her father, politically? “Yes.” You mean maybe she recognizes that her father had a weakness of dictatorship? “Who knows? But anyways, she’s a very interesting, talented woman. And you know, I’d be very interested to watch her political future. I hope in your article about Park Chung-hee you can mention that he has left a very influential talented daughter who is playing, I think, a very constructive role in the political life of Korea today.” Do you think the Korean evaluation of Park Chung-hee might change if Park Geun-hye wins the presidential election? “I think it’s already changing. I think when he was killed, there was sadness, but a sense of regret that he stayed too long and I think the negatives of his regime were uppermost in Koreans’ minds. Now with the perspective of time, taking a look at everything he had accomplished, and the Korea‘s rise economically is his legacy. You know I have a … I think this is a funny story. I went through a parachute training at Fort Benning in Georgia in 1951, during the Korean War. I was in CIA and they didn’t have their own training base. But anyway, I was on jump training. And so there was a town nearby Phoenix city, where there were a lot of bars, I would go have a beer. And they a comedian there and he... this was September 1951. Korean War was going on. And a lot of GIs there were heading for Korea. And this comedian would get up and say ‘There are three dread diseases you don’t want to catch: syphilis, gonorrhea, and gone to Korea. And everybody laughed, because nobody wanted to go to Korea. Syphilis, terrible disease; gonorrhea is a terrible disease; gone to Korea is equally bad. So it’s a joke, but it’s a very bad thing to say about Korea. Last year, 2010, I went back to Georgia to go to the opening of KIA factory in Westpoint GA. And there was dinner the night before, and the governor of GA was there, named Sonny Perdue, and Jung Monggu was there, from Hyundai. So the governor Perdue says to Chairman Jung, ‘I want to thank you for building this plant in my state, Westpoint GA. Your decision to do this is the single largest economic development plan in the history of the state of GA.’ So from 1951, you’ve gone from the bad disease that you don’t want to catch to the author of the biggest economic development plan in the history of the state of Georgia. That’s an extraordinary rise. Extraordinary. And Park Cung-hee deserved tremendous amount of credit for that.” Because he did the foundational work? “Absolutely. And the relationship between him and Jung Jooyoung, and the whole Hyundai empire. And anyways, his legacy is very powerful.” Some scholars share that point with you: Professor Bogel at Harvard and Professor Amstein at MIT. They say the economic development and democratic progress can’t be made at the same time in developing countries. on that score, Park’s plan was right because he focused on one, economic development, even thought that means the democratic progress was sacrificed. “Yes. Well, I think there’re some truths to it. I don’t think it’s completely .. I think both can come along. And I think Korea has done a great job. I think the change in 1987 was very key decision, which allowed Roh Tae-woo be elected. Although he was a military man, he acted very democratic, in a very democratic way. You had direct election for the president. And the two Kims ran against him. If neither stepped aside, if one of them stepped aside, there’d have been Kim instead of Roh, because he had under 40 percent or something like that in vote. So I don’t think the economic development and democracy are completely exclusive. And I think Korea’s plan was remarkably good in bringing both along. But economics led the way. That’s why I am interested in helping North Korea develop economically, because if they develop economically they’ll come out of their isolation. And they’ll see it is in their interest to treat their people better, which has happened in South Korea.” However, young folks in their 30s or 40s nowadays in Korea think of Park Chung-hee more as a dictator than as a developer of the country. Those in their 50s or over think the other way around. Park has two sides. “Very much so. And my feeling is that .. I have a great respect for Park Chung-hee. I think I admire his intelligence, I admire his strategic sense of the way South Korea should develop economically, and I also evaluate his pragmatic side, where he made the choice to dump Lee Hoorak, in the interest of stronger relationship with the U.S. in 1973.” Another question. In 1976, some say that CIA informed the coup against Park from the Korean government? “I don’t know about it. I don’t think so. I’ve never heard about it. Don’t know about it. I don’t know anything about that.” Thank you so much for this long, long interview. Last, do you have any comments or thoughts to share with Koreans? “I think I have covered most of the.. most of them. I think that.. his intelligence, his pragmatism, I mean Park Chung-hee, the fact that he would sacrifice Lee Hoorak for the sake of better relations with us...” What’s his character like? “As I said I was interested to see his sense of humor on the golf course. It was interesting to me that he invited me to play golf, because I think he knew that I had helped save Kim Daejung’s life in 1973 and he knew that I had protested against Lee Hoorak, he knew that I thought he needed a minister of bad news, but still he invited me to play golf.” Was it the only meeting? “No, I saw him at several meetings in the Blue House but that was the only informal meeting. And it was interesting to me that he had sense of humor, how friendly he was when he discovered I could speak Japanese, because he was kind of.. didn’t know that, and his English is not very good. But his Japanese was of course fluent, and mine was quite fluent those days also.” I heard that Park is good at jokes. “Yes, Yes. And that was funny. I used to play golf at Taeneung. And I was told that there was one hole there, where it was a long shot over water. And there’s another hole where you have to hit over hill, and if you hit the ball over the hill you become Colonel. Anyway, Park, I was told, would go out sometimes and sit at the hole where you have to hit over the water, and he would take note of who hit over the water and who didn’t. And that he was suspicious of the guy who would always hit way over the water, because ‘Ah! He’s playing too much golf, not paying attention to his work; and the guy who hit it over the water, ah, this guy must be working hard.’ So there was that kind of story about him.” It’s a joke. But the officer must have been afraid. “Oh, absolutely. People were scared to death. As I saw that at the golf, they sat like school boys. They didn’t say anything. He‘s one of the most interesting Asians I’ve ever met. Really. And Korea was lucky to have him.” Thank you for this interview. My impression about you is that you are not tied too much to the ideological framework, if I may say so. “Yeah, I try to be. You know, a lot of people think that CIA officers are always very right wing and I am not. I think CIA people are trying to get at what is true, the fact. And I studied philosophy in college, and intelligence officers are always trying to open the curtain and look at the reality behind the curtain. And when you do that, you have to be objective about what you see. And there are some people I met that I don‘t like at all. I didn’t like Hoorak, I didn’t like Cha Jeechul. But with most Koreans, I feel very comfortable. I feel that Japanese... I spent 10 years in Japan. And the Japanese... it’s very hard for you to know what they think of you, whereas Koreans are always very direct.” Thank you. Please direct questions or comments to [englishhani@hani.co.kr]