Germany and the Origins of the First World War

Germany and the Origins of the First World War 
David E. Kaiser 
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The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 55, No. 3. (Sep., 1983), pp. AA2-A1A. 
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Germany and the Origins of the First World War 
David E. Kaiser 
Carnegie-Mellon University 
Twenty-two years ago Fritz Fischer's Griff nach der Weltmacht (Dus- 
seldorf, 1961) reopened the question of Germany's responsibility for the 
First World War. Germany, Fischer argued, had purposely brought about 
a European conflict in 1914 in an effort to become a world power. Equally 
significantly, he suggested that the sources of Germany's conduct must 
be sought in her domestic political, economic, and social structure. Fischer 
later elaborated his thesis in another work, Krieg der Illusionen (Dus- 
seldorf, 1969). No postwar historian has been more influential; a steady 
stream of monographs has elaborated Fischer's thesis during the last two 
decades. In the long run Fischer's methodological emphasis on the need 
to focus on the interaction of imperial domestic and foreign policy — a 
near-heresy in Germany in 1961 despite the earlier pioneering work of 
Eckhart Kehr — has been at least as influential as his substantive conclusion 
that the German government was primarily responsible for the First World 
War. Most subsequent literature has focused upon the influence of domestic 
factors on German foreign policy, paying particular attention to the in- 
auguration of Weltpolitik in 1897 and the outbreak of the war in 1914. 
It is perhaps the emphasis of Fischer and his successors upon the 
connections between internal and external policies that has made German 
responsibility for the war one of the very few European diplomatic ques- ' 
tions to excite such widespread interest over the last twenty years. Yet 
the results of their attempt to broaden the focus of diplomatic history 
have been disappointing; the fascinating and critical problem of relating 
German society and politics to the conduct of the Imperial government 
has not been solved. Fischer himself has been frequently and rightly 
criticized for merely concatenating discussions of the political and ideo- 
logical climate of pre-1914 Germany — liberally spliced with quotations 
from extreme polemicists — with more traditional analyses of the German 
government's major decisions, while failing to explain exactly how the 
former influenced the latter. Other historians have developed much more 
I would like to thank Lamar Cecil, Thomas Childers, Timothy J. McKeown, 
Ernest R. May, and Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., for their comments on earlier 
drafts of this work. 
[Journal of Modern History 55 (September 1983): 442-474 
© 1983 by the University of Chicago. 0022-2801/83/5503/01$01 .00 
All rights reserved. 
Germany and the Origins of World War I 443 
explicit models relating German foreign policy to domestic structures, 
but these have generally been too unsubtle to uncover the real motives 
of the German government. 
Despite many differences of emphasis and opinion, it is fair to say that 
a far-reaching consensus of German, British, and American historians 
now agrees that German foreign policy after 1897 must be understood 
as a response to the internal threat of socialism and democracy. In 1897 
the Imperial government decided to deal with domestic discontent by 
pursuing an aggressive foreign policy; subsequently it regarded a foreign 
war as a useful option should domestic problems become intolerable. 
This in turn has led to the view that Berlin helped unleash war in 1914 
because war had become the only way out of Germany's domestic dif- 
ficulties. These views have been most specifically advanced by V. R. 
Berghahn in Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (New York, 
1973) and Hans-Ulrich Wehler in Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918 
(Gottingen, 1973), both of whom see the introduction of Weltpolitik in 
1897 and the decision for war in 1914 as attempts by an aristocratic- 
agrarian elite to escape the political consequences of the industrialization 
of Germany.^ Paul Kennedy's The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 
1860-1914 (London, 1980) also stresses the government's use of Welt- 
politik as a weapon against the political consequences of industrialization, 
and agrees that increasing concern with the rise of the Social Democrats 
contributed to the government's policies in July 1914. In an essay on 
the causes of the First World War Arno Mayer suggested that in 1914 
elements within the German government — possibly including the chan- 
cellor — "looked to a smashing diplomatic or military triumph to con- 
solidate the monarchy, to perpetuate Prussia's three-class franchise, and 
to check both reformists and revolutionaries."^ In July 1914. The Outbreak 
of the First World War (New York, 1974) Immanuel Geiss endorsed many 
aspects of these views, although Geiss, like Fischer, is equally interested 
in ideological and psychological influences on German policy. In Re- 
shaping the German Right. Radical Nationalism and Political Change 
after Bismarck (New Haven, 1980) Geoff Eley argues that the German 
government's manipulation of nationalism has been vastly exaggerated, 
yet adds that by 1914 the German government was in an "impossible 
situation."^ Wolfgang Mommsen, while supplying many correctives to 
' See also Wehler's "Probleme des Imperialismus," Krisenherde des Kais- 
erreichs 1871-1914 (Gottingen, 1970), pp. 133-134. 
^ "Domestic Causes of the First World War," The Responsibility of Power, 
ed. Leonard Krieger and Fritz Stern (New York, 1967), p. 297. 
^ Eley, Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and Political Change 
after Bismark (New Haven, 1980), p. 351. 
444 Kaiser 
more extreme interpretations, has concluded that war broke out largely 
because the German government failed to function effectively in 1914, 
leaving Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg unable to resist the 
influence of the military/ In the meantime other historians have shed 
welcome light on particular crises, institutions, and individuals important 
to German foreign policy in the years 1897-1914: Dirk Stegmann on the 
role of interest groups, Klaus Wernecke on the press and public opinion, 
Heiner Raulff on the first Moroccan crisis, Barbara Vogel on German- 
Russian relations, Raymond Poidevin on Franco-German economic and 
financial rivalries, Isabel Hull on the emperor and his entourage, Peter 
Winzen on Bernhard von Bulow, and Konrad Jarausch on Bethmann 
Hollweg.^ 
Unquestionably the German government in the years 1897-1914 care- 
fully considered foreign policy initiatives in light of their domestic con- 
sequences. Yet on the whole recent literature has distorted the domestic 
aims which foreign policy was designed to achieve before 1914, mis- 
understood the goals of Weltpolitik as originally adopted in 1897, and 
obscured the real reasons for the 1914 decisions that helped unleash a 
world war.^ Insufficient attention has also been given to the critically 
different approaches of the last two prewar chancellors, Bulow and Beth- 
mann Hollweg. 
Thus, although the government did adopt Weltpolitik in 1897 largely 
for domestic reasons, both its intended domestic function and its actual 
^ Wolfgang Mommsen, "Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy Before 
1914," Central European History 6: 1 (March 1973): 11-43. 
^ Dirk Stegmann, Die Erben Bismarcks. Parteien und Verbdnde in der Spdtphase 
des Wilhelminischen Deutschlands 1897-1918 (Cologne and Berlin, 1970); Klaus 
Wernecke, Der Wille zur Weltgeltung. Aussenpolitik und Ojfentlichkeit im Kais- 
erreich am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges (Diisseldorf , 1969); Heiner Raulff, 
Zwischen Machtpolitik und Imperialismus. Die deutsche Frankreichpolitik 1904- 
05 (Diisseldorf, 1976); B. Vogel, Deutsche Russlandpolitik. Das Scheitern der 
deutschen Weltpolitik unter Biilow (Diisseldorf, 1973); Raymond Poidevin, Les 
relations economiques et financieres entre la France et V Allemagne de 1898 a 
1914 (Paris, 1969); Isabel V. Hull, The Entourage of Kaiser Wilhelm II 1888- 
1918 (New York, 1982); Peter Winzen, Billows Weltmachtkonzept (Boppard am 
Rhein, 1977); Konrad Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor. Bethmann Hollweg 
and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven, 1973). Another important 
addition to the literature is Kaiser Wilhelm II. New Interpretations. The Corfu 
Papers, ed. John C. G. Rohl and Nicolaus Sombart (New York, 1982). 
^ Since our concern is with alternative explanations of German foreign policy 
before 1914 the question of Germany's responsibility for the war relative to that 
of other powers is momentarily being left open. Few historians would now deny 
that Germany bore substantial responsibility for the conflict; whether Berlin was 
principally responsible will be discussed later. 
Germany and the Origins of World War I 445 
political effects have been vastly exaggerated. Biilow, Alfred von Tirpitz, 
and the other originators of this policy never believed that it could maintain 
the conservative aristocracy in a position of unquestioned political / 
preeminence and never intended to use it in this way. The umbrella of 
Weltpolitik covered a series of bargains among a wide spectrum of interest 
groups, and the new foreign policy did not make the task of satisfying 
the empire's different constituencies much easier. Nor did the government 
regard war as a useful means of dealing with Germany's domestic dif- 
ficulties; Bulow on the contrary realized that war was more likely to 
exacerbate these problems than to solve them, even if Germany won. 
Bulow's foreign policy goals were also moderate. The vagueness of the 
stated aims of Weltpolitik reflected a real lack of any specific goals; the 
German government generally contented itself with modest overseas gains, 
desiring only to show that Germany was keeping up in the continuing 
worldwide struggle for territory and influence. No pro- war consensus 
developed in Berlin in any of the major pre- 19 14 crises. Btilow encouraged 
the ideal of Weltpolitik, but never allowed it to carry him away. 
Under Bethmann Hollweg Weltpolitik was of considerably less domestic 
use; after 1909 new cleavages within German society and politics made 
it impossible for the government to use foreign policy to increase its 
domestic support. Bethmann too feared the domestic consequences of 
war, and knew in 1914 that a conflict was likely to weaken Germany's 
political structure rather than strengthen it. But Bethmann in 1914 risked 
war because of a mistaken belief that Germany's international position 
demanded it. Sharing the widespread conviction that German expansion 
was necessary and estimating that Germany's chances for success were 
diminishing, the chancellor made decisions that led directly to war. 
Undoubtedly the adoption of Weltpolitik in 1897 did grow out of a 
crisis in domestic policy, and the men who assumed control of the German 
government in that year — Bulow and Tirpirtz, the Imperial Secretaries 
of State for Foreign Affairs and for the Navy, and Prussian Finance 
Minister Johannes Miquel — certainly took that crisis most seriously. Yet 
the crisis had relatively little to do with the consequences of industrial- 
ization in Germany, and still less to do with any imminent Social Dem- 
ocratic threat to the structure of German society and government. Rather 
it involved a breakdown of confidence among institutions and individuals 
whose cooperation was necessary if the government of the empire was 
to function: the parties in the Reichstag, the south German states, the 
chancellor and his state secretaries, and above all, the emperor himself. 
Conservative agrarian anger over Caprivi's trade treaties threatened the 
government far less seriously than the attitude of William II, who resented 
Chancellor Hohenlohe's subservience to the Reichstag and the Center 
446 Kaiser 
Party, demanded the construction of a much larger fleet, and called for 
a stronger line against the Social Democrats. William's frequent attempts 
to conduct foreign policy over the heads of the Foreign Office were 
making the government's situation untenable. More serious yet, William's 
extravagant utterances, including his statement to fellow princes in early 
1897 that Bismarck had been a pygmy beside William I and his discussion 
of a coup d'etat with the Grand Duke of Baden, had alarmed the south 
German states to the point that the Prussian minister to Bavaria regarded 
the disintegration of the Reich as a real possibility.^ William's behavior 
had also led some Center Party leaders to suggest that it was high time 
for Germany to become a parliamentary regime.^ 
How was this crisis to be dealt with? Some of the Kaiser's more extreme 
advisers like General Alfred von Waldersee and Philipp Eulenburg called 
for a coup d'etat, and William himself seems at the very least to have 
wanted to increase the government's authority over the Reichstag. The 
context of his late 1 895 remark, "Biilow will be my Bismarck," indicates 
that he had in mind the Iron Chancellor's role in bringing the Prussian 
Landtag in line during the constitutional conflict.^ But the more sensible 
bureaucrats — who as we shall see never surrendered control of German 
policy before 1914 — realized that Germany had to retain its limited con- 
stitutional government. "You instinctively incline to an autocratic regime," 
wrote Friedrich von Holstein to Eulenburg in 1896. "I am in favor of a 
moderate use of a practicable system of constitutional cooperative gov- 
ernment which, with the exception of St. Petersburg and Constantinople, 
is in operation in the rest of the European and civilized world." ^^ And 
although Billow himself argued in 1897 that the chancellor must serve 
the emperor rather than the Reichstag, he clearly intended to reconcile 
the upper and middle classes and the emperor within the framework of 
the existing regime. Not only did he too oppose a coup d'etat, he also 
refused to become excessively alarmed by the rise of socialism. ^^ 
^ Winzen, Billows Weltmachtkonzept , pp. 36-38, shows that Bulow during the 
1890s was also seriously concerned by the danger of the disintegration of the 
empire. 
^ See J. C. G. Rohl, Germany without Bismarck. The Crisis of Government 
in the Second Reich, 1890-1900 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), pp. 156- 
175, 212-222. Eley, Reshaping the German Right, and David Blackbourn, Class, 
Religion and Local Politics in Wilhelmine Germany. The Center Party in Wiirt- 
temberg before 1914 (New Haven, 1980), have both argued that increased mass 
participation in German political life also helped produce a crisis in the late 
1890s. 
^ Quoted in Rohl, Germany Without Bismarck, p. 158. 
'^ Ibid., p. 170. 
" Kathy Lerman, "The Decisive Relationship: Kaiser Wilhelm II and Chancellor 
Bemhard von Bulow, 1900-05," Kaiser Wilhelm II, pp. 221-47; Winzen, Bulows 
Weltmachtkonzept , pp. 38-40. 
Germany and the Origins of World War I 447 
The construction of a fleet and the inauguration of a more active foreign 
policy had been demanded for some time by radical nationalists, many 
academics, and the emperor himself, all of whom believed that a state 
of Germany's size and wealth required a larger navy and empire. ^^ But 
from the standpoint of the government the Navy Law's most important 
function was to reconcile the emperor, the government, the Reichstag, 
the south German states, and public opinion. Biilow, who had shown 
little interest in a large fleet before his appointment as state secretary for 
foreign affairs in 1897, quickly discovered that Wilhelm would insist 
upon one; by the following year he could write that the new Navy Law 
"would be a tremendous triumph and would benefit our trade, our security, 
our future and above all the person of our dear Kaiser." ^^ By securing 
the passage of the law Bulow and Tirpitz bolstered the emperor's confidence 
in themselves and in the Reichstag. Even their continuing dependence 
on the Center seemed less reprehensible after the 1898 bill passed with 
the support of two-thirds of the Center deputies. ^"^ Its passage showed 
that the emperor, the government, and the parties could work together, 
and thereby eased the immediate crisis. 
When however one asks whether Weltpolitik involved a basic change 
in the power base upon which the government relied or even strengthened 
the government's electoral base, the answer must be in the negative. 
Weltpolitik was not a magic wand capable of making the government's ^ 
problems disappear. Instead it served as a patriotic umbrella underneath 
which Bulow bought off all the major parties and interest groups with 
other concessions. Johannes von Miquel's Sammlungspolitik brought to- 
gether agrarian Conservatives and heavy industry behind a program of 
high tariffs. Biilow also wooed the Conservatives with a more strenuous 
anti-Polish policy, while heavy industry profited from the construction 
of the fleet. But these measures did not turn industrialists and landowners 
into reliable government supporters. The Prussian Conservatives defeated 
the government's canal bill in 1899 after a bitter struggle, and heavy 
industry was complaining about the government's liberal social policy 
by 1901.^^ Biilow in any case never dreamed that he could rely on such 
a narrow political base.^^ The support of the Center remained critical, 
and the new state secretary of the interior, Arthur von Posadowsky- 
'^ Winzen, Billows Weltmachtkonzept , pp. 62-64, 69-73. 
'^ Rohl, Germany Without Bismarck, p. 253. 
^"^ Winzen, Billows Weltmachtkonzept, pp. 83-86. For its part the Center was 
more than willing to collaborate with the government in an effort to improve the 
social and economic lot of German Catholics; see Blackbourn, Class, Religion 
and Local Politics in Wilhelmine Germany, pp. 23-60. 
'^ Stegmann, Die Erben Bismarcks, pp. 131-39. 
^^ Winzen, Billows Weltmachtkonzept, p. 428. 
448 Kaiser 
Wehner, worked closely with the Center in designing new social legislation 
during the next ten years. ^^ The south German states also had to be 
conciliated, and the Bavarian Max von Thielmann became Reich state 
secretary of the treasury. Alfred Krupp, a major beneficiary of the Navy 
Law, started the newspaper Suddeutsche Korrespondenz to help increase 
patriotic feeling outside Prussia. ^^ The electoral effects of Weltpolitik 
were limited indeed. In 1893 the four major Reichstag parties that had 
supported the Navy Law — Conservatives, Free Conservatives, National 
Liberals, and the Center — had won 249 seats. They won 227 seats in 
1898 and 226 in 1903. Many leaders of extraparliamentary organizations 
such as the Navy League and the Pan-German League had higher hopes 
for Weltpolitik', they wanted the fleet and other national issues to override 
the various sectional, religious, and political cleavages that still divided 
the empire. But although the German government's adoption of Weltpolitik 
enabled the Navy League in particular to form and flourish, the government 
did not share its visionary goals. To Bulow's government Weltpolitik 
was the occasion for a new series of bargains among entrenched interests 
and institutions which left the Reich government — the chancellor, the 
secretaries of state, and the emperor — in a significantly stronger position 
than hitherto. ^^ 
More important to the issue of the origins of the First World War is 
the question of whether Weltpolitik made war more likely. Given that 
William, Biilow, Tirpitz, and Miquel had decided upon a more active 
world policy largely for domestic reasons, was war part of their plan? 
This question can be answered in two ways: by delving into the foreign 
policy goals of the German leadership at the time Weltpolitik was intro- 
duced, and by studying their behavior during the decade after the intro- 
duction of the First Navy Law. Both approaches — and especially the 
second — suggest that the originators of Weltpolitik looked forward to a 
series of small-scale, marginal foreign policy successes, not to a major 
war. 
It is highly significant that the exhaustive researches of the last twenty 
years have not made it possible to say just what the foreign policy goals 
of Weltpolitik were. Bulow in particular seems to have avoided putting 
any specific ideas about Germany's future on paper, ^^ and Tirpitz had 
'^ Tirpitz also made significant concessions to win the Center's assent to the 
second Navy Law of 1900; ibid., pp. 108-126. 
'^ Rohl, Germany without Bismarck, pp. 223-251. 
'^ Eley, Reshaping the German Right, pp. 167-84, shows that Biilow fought 
efforts of extreme Navy League nationalists to turn the navy into a weapon 
against the "anti-national" Center. 
^^ Winzen, Billows Weltmachtkonzept , pp. 431-32. 
Germany and the Origins of World War I 449 

only slightly more to say. In the late 1890s both argued that Germany's 
population and industrial growth required both a fleet and a larger colonial 
empire. Most educated Germans seem to have shared this belief. During 
the 1890s, when recovery from the great depression was by no means 
secure and France and the United States were raising tariffs, the problem 
of foreign markets seemed serious. Even Caprivi, an opponent of Welt- 
politik, had believed it necessary to secure a larger industrial market for 
Germany, though he preferred to look for it in Central Europe. Still, the 
extremely limited economic significance of the territories the Germans 
actually tried to acquire after 1897 suggests that the government did not 
regard new colonial markets as a really urgent necessity, and as Germany's 
foreign trade grew steadily during the 1900s this need undoubtedly seemed 
even less acute. 
Recent work has emphasized the Anglophobic character of Weltpolitik, 
arguing that Bulow and Tirpitz were preparing for an eventual trial of 
strength with Britain. Certainly the decision to build the fleet immediately 
affected Anglo-German relations. Peter Winzen and Paul Kennedy have 
shown how Bulow decided that in the short run British feelers for an 
Anglo-German alliance had to be rejected, since Germany could not yet 
secure favorable terms. ^^ Yet whether Tirpitz or Bulow actually envisioned 
an eventual war with Britain is much more difficult to say. In order to 
justify the expense of the fleet Tirpitz had no choice but to speak in terms 
of an eventual clash with Britain; otherwise his beloved battleships would 
have no real use. We shall see that he sang another tune when war with 
England loomed as a real possibility. Nor must Bulow's diplomatic tactics 
necessarily have harbored sinister intentions. While rejecting an alliance 
with Britain he did not exclude cooperative arrangements. In 1900 he 
was more than ready to join London in a partition of the Portuguese 
empire. ^^ His reserve towards London can just as easily be regarded as 
an attempt to make a virtue of necessity. The state of German public 
opinion in the era of the Boer War probably made an alliance with England 
impossible anyway. 
Bulow's policy excluded either an alliance with Britain or an imminent 
clash; no evidence suggests that he aimed at an actual diplomatic or 
military victory over the United Kingdom. His speeches and private 
remarks during the early years of Weltpolitik do tend to cast England as 
both the leading world power and the principal obstacle to German world 
policy, yet they do not in any way deny the legitimacy of the British 
^' Ibid., pp. 80-81, 293-353; Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 226- 
27. 
^^ Winzen, Billows Weltmachtkonzept, pp. 265-11 . 
450 Kaiser 
Empire or imply that its size should be reduced. His principal concern, 
as expressed in a December 1899 Reichstag speech introducing the Second 
Navy Law, was that Germany not be left behind in the division of the 
world's weaker empires. He frequently referred to the Spanish-American 
War as the event which had exposed Germany's weaknesses most clearly; 
had we been stronger at sea, he seems to imply, we might have profited 
from the conflict ourselves. The fleet, one might infer from the speech, 
was not designed to challenge the British Empire directly but to make 
sure that Germany secured its rightful inheritance when some of Lord 
Salisbury's "dying nations" — the Portuguese, Ottoman, and Chinese 
empires probably figured most prominently in Bulow's mind — finally 
expired. ^^ In this and other speeches Biilow also tended to place the 
government midway between those who argued that Berlin had done too 
much to protect Germany's overseas interests and those who asked that 
they be pursued with greater ztdA}^ 
The conduct of the German government in the years after 1897 suggests 
that Bulow sought relatively cheap successes that would impress the 
emperor and German opinion without carrying any real risk of war. The 
actual colonial territory which Bulow seized at Kiaochow and in the 
Pacific lacked great strategic or economic significance, yet helped focus 
public opinion upon "the world-shaking and decisive problems of foreign 
policy." "This gain will stimulate people and navy to follow your Majesty 
further along the path which leads to world power, greatness and eternal 
glory," Bulow wrote William publicly on the occasion of the seizure of 
the worthless Caroline Islands. ^^ Russia, he wrote Holstein in August of 
1901 , could receive a share of the Baghdad railway, but "anything which 
might look like a retreat, or worse, a defeat for German policy in Asia 
Minor must be carefully avoided in this. on the contrary the matter 
should be dressed up as renewed proof of the skill with which the men 
in charge of our foreign policy furthered Germany's world interests without 
endangering our good relations with our neighbors. "^^ Appearances, in 
^^ For the speech and some very interesting commentaries see Rhetorik und 
Weltpolitik. Eine interdiszeplindre Untersuchung politischer Reden von W. E. 
Gladstone , J . Chamberlain und B. v. Biilow, ed. Helmut Wiebrock (Wiesbaden, 
1974), pp. 145-192. 
^^ See his confidential remarks to the Reichstag budget committee on March 
27-28, 1900, quoted in Winzen, Billows Weltmachtkonzept, pp. 120-22, and 
his Reichstag remarks of March 3, 1902, Winzen, "Prince Bulow's Weltmacht- 
politik,'' Australian Journal of Politics and History 22: 2 (August 1976): 239. 
^^ Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 365, 236. 
^^ Norman Rich and M. H. Fisher, eds.. The Holstein Papers (Cambridge, 
1963), 4: 784. 
Germany and the Origins of World War I 451 
short, were more important than realities. Tirpitz was even more cautious. 
While eager to stress the long-term threat from England in order to justify 
the fleet, he opposed the seizure of Kiaochow on the grounds that it 
involved an excessive risk of a conflict with Russia. 
The real nature of Bulow's policy definitely emerged during the years 
1904-06, when the Russo-Japanese War, the Anglo-French entente, and 
French moves into Morocco threatened to transform the international 
situation. Recent monographs have stressed Germany's efforts during 
these years to bring about a dramatic change in the European balance of 
power, and specifically to conclude a Russo-German alliance and break 
or weaken the Anglo-French entente. ^^ The German government, however, 
pursued these aims without losing sight of important constraints. Berlin's 
more aggressive policies sometimes seemed to increase the danger of a 
European war, but no consensus in favor of war ever emerged within the 
Imperial government. Weltpolitik remained a policy of limited risks and 
limited aims. 
With respect to the Russo-Japanese War, Bulow clearly welcomed the 
conflict and hoped to benefit from it even before it had begun. "From 
the point of view of our internal politics and to counteract the general 
dissatisfaction in Germany," he wrote Holstein in January 1904, "it 
would of course be a good thing if 'somewhere far away' the nations 
came to blows. "^^ The war would also sharpen the conflict between 
Russia and "England-America," which Bulow clearly regarded as an 
advantage, and could break up the Dual Alliance, since France would 
not join Russia in a war against England. When in October 1904 the 
Dogger Bank incident threatened to bring England into the war Bulow 
decided the time was ripe for an actual Russo-German alliance which 
France would subsequently be forced to join. German offers of an alliance 
in October of 1904 and July 1905 got nowhere because only the tsar 
among the responsible Russian officials seemed interested. Yet the re- 
sistance within the German government to such a drastic reorientation 
of policy is equally significant. When Bulow put the question of the 
alliance before a council of ministers on October 26, 1904, Tirpitz, 
despite his support of an eventual Russo-German alliance, argued that 
at the present moment it would only provoke an English attack against 
which Russia would be no help whatever. Chief of the General Staff 
Count Alfred von Schlieffen also doubted the military benefits of such 
an alliance; should England attack Germany he regarded a Russian move 
against India as unlikely. Holstein supported Bulow's suggestion, but 
^^ Vogel, Deutsche Russlandpolitik; Raulff, Machtpolitik und Imperialismus . 
2^ Holstein Papers, 4: 818. 
452 Kaiser 
State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Oswald von Richthofen agreed with 
Tirpitz."^^ Billow himself came to share the view that such an alliance 
would not be worth the risk of war. one thing is certain," he wrote 
Holstein on December 13: "while an agreement with Russia safeguarding 
the peace and raising our position in the world would be a great success 
for our foreign policy and would be welcomed in wide and in the best 
circles as a return to the traditions of Bismarckian policy, a bond with 
Russia which would in contrast to this draw England's hostility upon us 
would certainly be condemned unanimously by the whole nation, by the 
German Princes first of all."^^ Neither the chancellor, nor the Foreign 
Office, nor the army, nor the navy were in the least anxious for war. 
German policy during the Moroccan crisis also shied away from any 
risk of war. Having failed to weaken England's position by concluding 
an alliance with Russia, the German government — led in this instance 
by Holstein — decided to strike a blow at the new Anglo-French entente 
by showing the French that they could not rely upon British support to 
realize their colonial aims. They did not, it is clear, act on behalf of 
German commercial interests in Morocco, who had no objection to working 
with the French. ^^ Nor did they want concrete territorial gains. While 
William and certain Foreign Office officials had toyed with the idea of 
asking for compensation in the Canary Islands should France and Spain 
partition Morocco, Holstein and Biilow simply wanted to bring France 
in line by forcing the French to submit the Morocco question to a con- 
ference.^^ As usual, prestige — both domestic and foreign — remained the 
key consideration. Significantly, after Delcasse resigned in June 1905 
and Rouvier agreed to a conference the following month, both Biilow 
and William concluded that they had achieved their aims. Holstein dis- 
agreed, believing that France must be forced to make major concessions, 
but he could not carry the day, and his failure to convince his superiors 
to hold to an uncompromising policy helped lead to his resignation.^^ 
No one within the German government pushed for a war over Morocco. 
Though neither Raulff nor Kennedy has discovered any specific statement 
of Tirpitz's opinion, the latter reasonably assumes that his attitude towards 
a war involving England — in which the Imperial Navy would have no 
chance — was no more favorable than in the fall of 1904.^^ Count von 
^^ Vogel, Deutsche Russlandpolitik, pp. 206-212. 
^^ Holstein Papers, 4: 867. 
^^ Raulff, Machtpolitik und Imperialismus, pp. 123-25. 
^2 Ibid., pp. 54-55. 
^^ Ibid., pp. 105-106, 123; see also Norman Rich, Friedrich von Holstein 
(Cambridge, 1965), 2: 696-745. 
^^ Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 276. Tirpitz's failure to express 
a written opinion could also be interpreted as evidence that the question was 
never seriously raised. 
Germany and the Origins of World War I 453 
Schlieffen noted that this would be a favorable moment tor a war with 
France, but this was not much more than a statement of the obvious, and 
Prussian War Minister Karl von Einem argued on the contrary that German 
artillery was not ready for war.^^ William characteristically ran hot and 
cold; his threats sometimes frightened the French, but his eagerness for 
a settlement frequently showed through. And while Holstein continually 
insisted on securing real concessions from France, his letters in June 
1905 show that he wanted a successful conference, not a Franco-German 
war which he suspected England of trying to bring about. ^^ He had earlier 
given another reason for a reserved policy: that the emperor, in case of 
European complications, would unconditionally reserve for himself the 
military command, "which, since he is entirely incapable militarily, 
must lead to horrible catastrophes."^^ Biilow favored a settlement with 
France as early as July 1905, and in February 1906 he summarized his 
position. "Everything depends on our seizing the right moment for an^ 
acceptable compromise," he wrote Holstein. "We cannot tolerate a hu- 
miliation. The failure of the conference would be, no matter how one 
looked at it, a diplomatic setback for us. Neither public opinion. Parlia- 
ment, Princes, or even the army will have anything to do with a war over 
Morocco. "^^ 
Of particular interest in light of recent historiography is the general 
agreement that a war over Morocco would not be popular. The concurrent 
colonial war in southwest Africa had not been a public relations success 
and the German press did not regard Morocco as a proper casus belli. 
Even conservative papers pointed to the Russian Revolution as evidence 
that war must not be undertaken without a firm patriotic basis, and War 
Minister Einem noted that the Morocco issue lacked the necessary "in- 
tegrating power. "^^ Under the circumstances the outcome of the crisis 
was virtually a foregone conclusion. After the government avoided a 
breakdown of the Algeciras conference by making substantial concessions 
to the French, Biilow painted the outcome in rosy colors for the press 
and parliament. 
During his remaining three years in power Biilow continued to exploit 
Weltpolitik domestically while abandoning any attempt to transform the 
international situation. In late 1906 he faced a dilemma similar to that 
of 1897; the emperor had again become angry at the government's de- 
pendence upon the Reichstag, and especially upon the Center Party. 
^^ Raulff, Machtpolitik und Imperialismus, pp. 130-33. 
^^ Holstein Papers, 4: 891, 897. 
^^ Raulff, Machtpolitik und Imperialismus, p. 73 n. 
^^ Ibid., pp. 123-25; Holstein Papers, 4: 936. 
^^ Raulff, Machtpolitik und Imperialismus, pp. 80, 133-44. 
454 Kaiser 
When the Center suddenly joined the Social Democrats in opposition to 
the war in southwest Africa Biilow dissolved the Reichstag and turned 
the ensuing election into a referendum on Weltpolitik. Critical to the 
government's success were the left liberal parties, which adopted a pro- 
government stance in foreign policy and generally refused to support 
Social Democrats in the second round of the Reichstag elections. As a 
result the Social Democratic representation fell from eighty-one seats to 
just forty-three, and Biilow formed a government majority that entirely 
excluded the Center/^ The elections reaffirmed the country's support for 
Weltpolitik and the government's independence of any particular party. 
Despite this brilliant success, the weaknesses of Weltpolitik both as a 
foreign and as a domestic strategy began to emerge during the remaining 
three years of Billow's chancellorship. By the time he left office in 1909 
Biilow had decided that naval construction, in particular, had to be cur- 
tailed. He had also become even more convinced that war could never 
serve either the domestic or the foreign policy interests of the German 
government. The chancellor had questioned whether the fleet program 
would ever improve Germany's external situation as early as 1907, but 
new English construction, popular pressure, and the enthusiasm of the 
emperor forced him to endorse new increases in the navy in the following 
year. By 1908-09 he had definitely decided that the naval game was not 
worth the candle. In August of 1908 he made clear in letters to Holstein 
that he favored an eventual naval agreement in order to avoid a hopeless 
war with England, although as always he emphasized that Germany must 
never seem to yield to foreign pressure. Biilow's warnings to William 
against closing the door to naval conversations, which V. R. Berghahn 
interprets simply as a ploy to reassure London that Germany did not plan 
war, actually reflected his intention of making a deal when agitation had 
died down."^^ 
Significantly, Biilow now regarded a naval slowdown as essential for 
domestic as well as foreign policy reasons. The financial burden of naval 
armaments had become intolerable. In the midst of drawing up the financial 
reform, including an inheritance tax, which was eventually to destroy 
his coalition and lead to his fall, Biilow repeated again and again that 
Germany could not afford the world's largest army, a huge navy, and 
the world's most expensive social policy. He clearly intended to reduce 
naval expenditures by insisting on the priority of the army. The German 
^^ George Dunlap Crothers, The German Elections of 1907 (New York, 1941), 
passim. The Socialists' recent discussions of a mass strike probably frightened 
away some voters as well. 
^^ Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War, pp. 64-69. 
Germany and the Origins of World War I 455 
government's perennial deficit had to be eliminated; while the fleet itself 
insured the antagonism of England and increased the danger of war, the 
loans necessary to finance it robbed Germany of an important means of 
extending its influence peacefully. "It is increasingly clear to me," he 
wrote Holstein in September 1908, "what this reform of our finances 
will mean not only economically and militarily, but also purely diplo- 
matically. The undiminished enormous influence of France, her unshakable 
prestige, is not only the result of her military strength nor even of her 
culture and language, but is to a great extent the product of her wealth 
of capital and its liquidity. That is the primary reason for the French 
influence in Spain, Italy, Russia, and many other countries. Now the 
French are trying to find a financial wedge in Hungary. That will emerge 
more clearly the longer we continue our miserable economic dependence 
on loans and contributions from the individual German states. "^^ 
Billow, then, had set upon a course of financial reform at home, naval 
limitation and improved relations with Britain to reduce the danger of 
war, and a gradual expansion of German influence in the world at large. 
The question of war and peace arose once again in early 1909 as a result 
of the Bosnian crisis. Helmuth von Moltke, the new chief of the general 
staff, regarded the European situation as propitious for war, and some 
army officers apparently felt that a war might provide the occasion for 
a coup d'etat. Knowing, as did all Europe, that Russia could not fight a 
war. Billow characteristically scored a cheap diplomatic success by issuing 
his March 1909 ultimatum. only a year later he admitted that this was 
more a triumph of style than of substance: "I considered," he wrote, 
"... that we would break the net of encirclement which existed more 
in imagination than in fact."^^ Yet his attitude towards war had not changed. 
In October 1908, during a minor crisis over Morocco which eventually 
concluded with a new Franco-German agreement, the crown prince re- 
proached Billow for an insufficiently vigorous defense of German interests 
and an excessive love of peace, adding that "a great part of the nation 
thinks as I do, and the whole army is longing to 'get at 'em.' " Billow's 
reply deserves to be quoted at some length. 
... I entirely agree with Your Imperial and Royal Highness that it is inadvisable 
too frequently to express one's love of peace, since this gives others too great a 
feeling of self-assurance. I too am convinced that, if a case involves one's country's 
honor, it is necessary to strike, coute que coute, and whatever the chances may 
seem to be. But, unless our honor is engaged, we should always ask ourselves 
what is to be expected from a war. No war in Europe can bring us much. There 
'^^ Holstein Papers, 4: 1 128; see also pp. 1 117 and 1 120. 
"^^ Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor, p. 62. 
456 Kaiser 
would be nothing for us to gain in the conquest of any fresh Slav or French 
territory/'^ If we annex small countries to the Empire we shall only strengthen 
those centrifugal elements which, alas, are never wanting in Germany. . . . 
In 1866 and 1870 there was a great prize to be won. Today that is no longer 
the case. Above all, we ought never to forget that nowadays no war can be 
declared unless a whole people is convinced that such a war is necessary and 
just. A war, lightly provoked, even if it were fought successfully, would have 
a bad effect on the country; while if it ended in defeat, it might entail the fall of 
the dynasty. History shows us that every great war is followed by a period of 
liberalism, since a people demands compensation for the sacrifices and effort 
war has entailed. But any war which ends in a defeat obliges the dynasty that 
declared it to make concessions which before would have seemed unheard of. . . . 
In affairs of this kind the opinion of the army cannot be decisive. It is excellent, 
no doubt, that the army should not feel its sword has rusted in the scabbard: it 
is necessary even that soldiers should be bellicose. But the task of a leader of 
policy is to get a clear view of consequences. Quidquid agis, prudenter agas et 
respice finem\ [Whoever would act, act prudently and consider the consequences.]'^^ 
This letter addresses every motive for war that historians have ascribed 
to the Imperial German governmental elite. To the claim that democra- 
tization might thereby be checked Biilow replied that even a victorious 
war would result in more concessions to the people, while a defeat might 
lead to something much worse. While noting that the military generally 
tended towards war, he stressed the responsibility of the political au- 
thorities. Responding implicitly to suggestions that Germany should ex- 
pand in Europe, he argued that new subjects would be as troublesome 
as the Alsace-Lorrainers and Poles. If he did not mention colonies, it 
was because, as he did say, England would be among Germany's enemies, 
and none would be acquired. Diplomatic successes and colonial acqui- 
sitions might help the government; war would not. Weltpolitik was simply 
one aspect of a broad strategy to hold the German Empire together and 
govern it effectively, and Biilow correctly estimated that war would 
exacerbate Germany's domestic difficulties without winning any worth- 
while prizes. 
By 1909 Tirpitz had also shown himself deeply averse to war, certainly 
in the short run and probably in the long as well. Tirpitz never tired of 
discussing the foreign and domestic benefits that his fleet was certain to 
bring to Germany; only in this way could he justify its cost. Yet it became 
clear — as he repeatedly stated during one crisis after another that the 
fleet was not yet ready for war and ignored the evidence that Germany 
could never overcome British numerical superiority — that for him the 
^^ Winzen, "Prince Billow's Weltmachtkonzept,'' p. 238, states that Biilow 
never showed any interest in continental expansion. 
45 
Memoirs of Prince von Biilow (Boston, 1931), 2: 458-61. 
Germany and the Origins of World War I 457 
navy was not a means, but an end/^ A true cold warrior, he continually 
stressed England's supposed threat to Germany's world position to justify 
the fleet's existence while pushing the date of any clash of arms further 
and further into the future/^ From time to time the grand admiral sought 
new pretexts for the construction of the fleet, including a proposed law 
to make all overseas Germans citizens of the empire/^ The real goal of 
his policy was not a victory over England, but a naval law that would 
guarantee him three new ships a year forever and release the navy from 
the effective control of the Reichstag. ^^ He consistently opposed war in 
every crisis from 1897 through 1914, refused to risk the fleet against the 
British when war did come, and, after the war, blamed Bethmann Hollweg 
bitterly for provoking the conflict that had destroyed his life's work.^^ 
By the time of Billow's resignation in 1909 the idea of the necessity 
of German expansion had become so deeply embedded among large seg- 
ments of the German population that his government's moderate Weltpolitik 
was being seriously challenged. Thus in 1907-08 Tirpitz, bowing to the 
agitation of August Keim and the Navy League, had to introduce a new 
naval law calling for the construction of four capital ships annually through 
1911, abandoning his original plan which would simply have guaranteed 
the construction of three ships annually for all time.^^ Undoubtedly Biilow 
and Tirpitz had fostered the expansionist climate within Germany by 
embracing and implementing Weltpolitik, and in this sense they bear 
some responsibility for the eventual outbreak of war. Yet as Paul Kennedy 
has recently suggested, the need for German expansion was so widely 
accepted by the 1 890s that it is almost inconceivable that any government 
^^ This was clearly grasped by Bethmann, who in 1914 remarked, "For 
Tirpitz the Navy is an end in itself" (Kurt Riezler, Tagebiicher, Aufsdtze, Dok- 
umente, ed. Karl Dietrich Erdmann [Gottingen, 1972], p. 188). 
'^^ V. R. Berghahn, RUstung und Machtpolitik. Zur Anatomie des "Kalten 
Krieges" vor 1914 (Diisseldorf, 1973) draws several interesting analogies between 
the Anglo-German and postwar Soviet- American arms races. 
^^ Holstein to Bulow, August 25, 190S, Holstein Papers, 4: 1121. According 
to Holstein, only Bethmann Hollweg of all the other ministers supported this 
law. 
'^^ V. R. Berghahn, Der Tirpitz-Plan. Genesis und V erf all einer innenpolitischen 
Krisenstrategie unter Wilhelm II, passim. Berghahn in my opinion overemphasizes 
the significance of Tirpitz's professed domestic political goals. 
^° Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 422. 
^' Berghahn, Der Tirpitz-Plan, pp. 505-591. Tirpitz especially regretted the 
new law because it left a five-year gap, beginning in 1912, during which con- 
struction would drop to two ships annually, and would therefore necessitate yet 
another naval law. Keim and the Navy League did not share his overriding 
interest in freeing the navy from parliamentary control once and for all. 
458 Kaiser 
could have forsaken such policies entirely. ^^ In this context Biilow deserves 
credit for recognizing that the gains of expansion had to be balanced 
against the possibly disastrous consequences of precipitate action, never 
forgetting the essential strength of Germany's international position, and 
contenting himself with cheap successes. Billow's successor lacked his 
understanding of the subtleties of Weltpolitik and of the impossibility of 
Germany's gaining anything meaningful from a new war. 
The German government did not help precipitate a world war in 1914 
because Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg regarded war as a 
useful solution to his domestic difficulties, or because the 1912 elections, 
in which the Social Democrats became the largest party in the Reichstag, 
left the governing elite with no option but to embark upon a risky foreign 
adventure. The record of Bethmann's chancellorship shows that he was 
not especially concerned by any Social Democratic threat, that he was 
no longer able to use foreign policy to solve domestic political problems, 
that his government became more rather than less effective as a result of 
the 1912 election , and that he anticipated that war would tend to overturn 
the status quo rather than maintain it. Yet despite all this, in 1914 Bethmann 
knowingly pursued policies carrying with them a substantial risk of world 
war. He did so because he believed more deeply than his predecessor in 
the inadequacy of Germany's international position, and because he failed 
to understand the chancellor's critical role within the Imperial German 
government. 
Like Biilow in 1 897 , Bethmann in 1 909 assumed power during a domestic 
political crisis. Yet Bethmann's problems, like Billow's, had little to do 
with Social Democracy; they stemmed from right-wing attempts to maintain 
the status quo rather than left-wing attempts to overturn it. Tension had 
begun building up after the formation of the Biilow bloc of Conservatives, 
Free Conservatives, National Liberals, and Progressives in 1907. The 
National Liberals, led by Ernst Basserman and Gustav Stresemann, set 
the tone of the bloc's domestic policy. They had no wish to overturn or 
democratize the political structure of the empire, but they deeply resented 
the exclusion of the upper bourgeoisie from the leadership of the gov- 
ernment, the civil service, and the army, and fought for a more equal 
distribution of both the burdens and rewards of Imperial life.^"^ Biilow 
did little to broaden his administration's social base, but he clearly agreed 
^^ Paul Kennedy, "The Kaiser and German Weltpolitik: Reflexions on Wilhelm 
II's Place in the Making of German Foreign Policy," Kaiser Wilhelm II, pp. 
148-152. 
^^ See especially Theodor Eschenburg, Das Kaiserreich am Scheideweg. Bas- 
sermann, Biilow undder Block (Berlin, 1929), pp. 20-25, and Beverly Heckart, 
From Bassermann to Bebel (New Haven, 1974), pp. 124-134. 
Germany and the Origins of World War I 459 
that the Conservatives must pay more Imperial taxes. Thus in 1909 he 
made the introduction of a lineal inheritance tax a question of confidence 
and submitted his resignation when the Center and Conservatives managed 
to defeat it. 
As Billow had already predicted/"^ the rest of the nation immediately 
turned bitterly against the Conservatives. The Center-Conservative de- 
cision to rely on indirect taxes to close the imperial deficit — including 
taxes on securities transactions — led to a liberal resurgence. In 1909 
industry, commerce, and finance formed the Hansabund to press for 
more equal taxation. Although heavy industrialists regarded this merely 
as a temporary maneuver and preferred their old alliance with the Con- 
servatives, the success of the Hansabund showed that its demands had 
struck a responsive chord among the German middle classes. The question 
of a new tariff also divided conservatives and liberals. As Billow's trade 
treaties neared expiration the agrarians and heavy industry asked for new 
increases, while financial and commercial interests committed themselves 
to current levels. For the time being the political leadership of the 
bourgeoisie unquestionably regarded the Conservatives and their Center 
allies as more serious enemies than the Social Democrats. ^^ In these 
circumstances the government could not use foreign policy to build an 
anti-Socialist front. 
Though forced temporarily to rely upon a Conservative-Center coalition, 
Bethmann Hollweg saw which way the political wind was blowing. Like 
his predecessor, Bethmann was only a very moderate reformer. He regarded 
the Conservatives as a critical though irresponsible pillar of the state, 
he defended the emperor in public even when he completely disagreed 
with him, and he resolutely opposed the parliamentarization or democ- 
ratization of the empire. Still, he conceived the reconciliation of the 
National Liberals, Center, and Conservatives as his principal task, to 
"make possible the concrete cooperation of all bourgeois [semble bur- 
gerlich] parties," and he recognized that it was the Conservatives who 
were standing in his way.^^ His 1910 proposals for the reform of the 
Prussian suffrage reflected these aims perfectly: in no way democratic, 
they aimed at manipulating the existing system so as to give the middle 
class more representation. The obstinacy of the Conservatives, which 
brought even these minor changes to grief, confirmed Bethmann' s prejudice 
against them: "Perhaps they will first have to pass through the hard 
^^ Eley, Reshaping the German Right, p. 315. 
^^ See Stegmann, Erben Bismarcks, pp. 176-95. 
^^ Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor, pp. 71-73, 84-88. 
460 Kaiser 
school of Reichstag elections," he commented, before they would see 
reason. ^^ 
In 1911 Alfred von Kiderlen-Wachter, the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, revived the idea of using a foreign policy success to benefit the 
government electorally, but his attempt was a disastrous failure. When 
France's intention to establish full political control over Morocco became 
clear he suggested the dispatch of warships to secure compensation, 
adding in conclusion that such a step could have favorable domestic 
effects: "With the sole exception of the Social Democratic Party public 
opinion at home would seriously blame the Imperial government if it 
allowed events in the Sharif Kingdom merely to take their course whereas 
we may assume without a doubt that tangible results will change the 
views of many dissatisfied voters and will have a not inconsiderable 
effect on the outcome of the pending Reichstag elections. "^^ Yet the 
preconditions that would have promised success for such a strategy were 
entirely absent. 
In the election years in which the Imperial government had used foreign 
policy to secure a pro-government majority — 1884, 1887, 1893, and 
1906 — issues like colonies and army bills had served to bring together 
parties essentially in agreement anyway while isolating parties like the 
Center, Progressives, or Social Democrats, who took an antinational 
stand. In 1911 the parties whose support Bethmann coveted — the Con- 
servatives, Free Conservatives, National Liberals, and the Center — could 
be counted on to support a forward policy over Morocco. Yet in the 
aftermath of the breakup of the Biilow bloc such an issue could not bridge 
the chasm between National Liberals and Conservatives. In addition, the 
left-wing parties had learned their lesson. During the crisis the Social 
Democrats and Progressives carefully avoided any position that could 
be characterized as antinational.^^ Worst of all, when the government 
decided to accept limited gains rather than risk war with England, the 
right-wing parties condemned its pusillanimity. Rather than putting aside 
their domestic complaints the National Liberals blamed the aristocrats 
at the Foreign Office for a policy which in their view took insufficient 
account of Germany's real national interests. 
Foreign policy played virtually no part in the 1912 elections. The 
various indirect taxes upon which the Conservatives and Center had 
insisted in 1909 had seriously affected the cost of living, and the National 
Liberals, Progressives, and Social Democrats used this issue against the 
^^ Ibid., p. 79. 
^^ Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 71-73. 
^^ Wernecke, Der Wille zur Weltgeltung, pp. 88-92. 
Germany and the Origins of World War I 461 
Blue-Black bloc with devastating effect. Almost without exception these 
three parties joined with one another in the second round of Reichstag 
elections. ^^ The Blue-Black bloc, which had won 219 seats in 1907, won 
just 167 in 1912.^^ The big winners, of course, were the Social Democrats, 
who went from 43 seats to 110. 
Recent work has assigned critical importance to the 1912 elections, 
arguing that they led to an important right-wing reaction, left the gov- 
ernment in a difficult if not impossible position, and renewed interest in 
war as a solution to the empire's domestic problems. Undoubtedly certain 
right-wing interest and pressure groups were sufficiently frightened by 
the Social Democratic victory to consolidate their forces and make new 
demands upon the government. The Agrarian League, the Central As- 
sociation of German Industrialists, and the Imperial League of the Middle 
Classes formed a new Cartel of the Productive Classes of 1913. These 
and other right-wing groups including the Pan-German League called 
for new measures against strikes and picketing, restrictive changes in 
Reichstag suffrage, radical anti-Semitic measures, and a cutback of the 
influence of the Reichstag within the government. The Pan-German leader 
Heinrich Class's popular pseudonymous book, Wenn ich der Kaiser war, 
linked these demands to calls for expansion abroad, and Eley has argued 
that a new alliance between the Cartel and the Pan-Germans now began 
to emerge. ^^ In late 1913 Class and the Pan-German General Konstantin 
von Gebsattel felt sufficiently emboldened to submit a memorandum 
embodying these views to the crown prince, who in turn passed it along 
to the chancellor and his father the emperor. ^^ 
Some have argued that the Socialist victory and right-wing reaction 
worsened Bethmann's position and that it seriously affected his policies. ^^ 
Yet in fact the election was neither a surprise nor a great disappointment 
to Bethmann, and the composition of the Reichstag allowed him to break 
the deadlock of 1907-1 1 and pass an extraordinary amount of important 
new legislation. Naval construction was slowed, the army was greatly 
expanded, and in 1913 Bethmann finally succeeded in passing a direct 
^^ Jurgen Bertram, Die Wahlen zum Deutschen Reichstag vom Jahre 1912 
(Dusseldorf, 1974), pp. 167-251. 
^^ These figures include the anti-Semitic and other fringe conservative parties. 
^^ Stegmann, Erben Bismarcks, pp. 277-304, 360-68; Eley, Reshaping the 
German Right, p. 318. 
^^ Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 282-83. 
^'^ Thus Berghahn on the 1912 elections: "The situation which Bethmann HoIIweg 
had been dreading since 1909 had come about" {Germany and the Approach of 
War, p. 103). Eley, Reshaping the German Right, p. 351, argues that new right- 
wing alliances "placed the government in an impossible situation." 
462 Kaiser 
Imperial property tax despite the opposition of the Conservatives. This 
did not in the least disturb him: "The tax compromise reached by the 
majority of the bourgeois [semble biirgerlich] parties," he commented, 
"may portend a gradual leveling of our political antagonisms."^^ Now 
that the National Liberals' main grievance had been assuaged the chancellor 
might reasonably look forward to a gradual renewal of cooperation among 
the biirgerlich parties and to a decline in Socialist representation at the 
next election. Despite the increasing right-wing hysteria Bethmann's 
moderate constitutional course had served him well, and the fate of the 
Gebsattel memorandum indicates that he still enjoyed the emperor's es- 
sential support. In letters to the crown prince both the chancellor and 
the emperor blasted Gebsattel' s proposals as irresponsible fantasies. ^^ 
In the Zabern affair Bethmann appeared to have learned from Billow's 
experience in the Daily Telegraph affair. Recognizing that only the emperor 
retained the power to dismiss him, he bowed to William's wishes and 
defended the army's conduct in the Reichstag in complete contradiction 
to his real views. And although the Reichstag passed a motion of no 
confidence as a result, the vote did not really threaten his position. When 
the Social Democrats argued that the vote required Bethmann to resign, 
the National Liberals, Progressives, and the Center all contested this 
interpretation.^^ 
Thus during the years 1912-14 the Imperial chancellor, while rejecting 
any radical solutions to Germany's internal political problems, had suc- 
cessfully implemented several major reforms: a much larger army, slower 
increases in the navy, and even a role for the parties of the left in passing 
the new financial reforms. At home Bethmann had accomplished most 
of what Billow had hoped to achieve in 1908. 
In foreign policy, however, the new chancellor's policies showed a 
critical difference in emphasis. Perhaps because Bethmann had risen 
through the ranks of the domestic Prussian bureaucracy historians have 
tended to discount his own views on foreign policy, generally stressing 
only his desire for better relations with Britain. Konrad Jarausch's bi- 
ography shows however that Bethmann had strong views on foreign policy 
and that his emphasis on an agreement with Britain was merely one 
^^ Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor, pp. 98-99. 
^^ Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor, p. 104; Hartmut Pogge-von Strandmann, 
"Staatstreichplane, Alldeutsche und Bethmann Hollweg," H. Pogge-von Strand- 
mann and Immanuel Geiss, Die Erforderlichkeit des Unmoglichen. Deutschland 
am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges (Frankfurt am Main, 1965), pp. 18-26, 
32-39. 
^^ Heckart, From Bassermann to Bebel, pp. 250-257. 
Germany and the Origins of World War I 463 
aspect of a far-reaching strategy for German expansion. Bethmann, in 
fact, was more concerned with German expansion than Biilow, who by 
1909 had realized that Germany had every reason to be pleased with its 
position in the world and no longer felt any great urgency about improving 
it. Perhaps because Bethmann was not a foreign policy specialist, he 
accepted rather uncritically the prevailing view that Germany's world 
position did not correspond to its strength or interests. 
Bethmann believed that Germany "must expand" in the world, spe- 
cifically in central Africa and Asia Minor. ^^ "For forty years," he told 
French Ambassador Jules Cambon in early 1914, "France has followed 
a grandiose policy. She has acquired an immense empire. . . . During 
this time an inactive Germany has not followed her example and today 
she needs a place in the sun. Germany, her unity established, sees her 
population grow enormously every day, her navy, her industry and her 
commerce show a development without equal and she is in a sense con- 
demned to spread outwards. "^^ Rejecting Tirpitz's argument that such 
expansion would only be possible when the German fleet was strong 
enough to deter the English, Bethmann shared Billow's view that it was 
impossible to alter the naval balance of power and counted on persuading 
London that German and British interests need not clash. In early 1912 
he commented to Admiral von Miiller that an alliance with Britain would 
allow Germany to form "a great colonial empire (Portuguese colonies, 
Belgian Congo, Dutch colonies). "^^ By then he had begun a complex 
series of negotiations with London designed to precipitate the partition 
of the Portuguese colonies, acquire at least part of the Belgian Congo, 
and arrange the construction of the Baghdad railway and the corresponding 
division of spheres of influence in the Ottoman Empire. 
But while working wholeheartedly for a colonial entente with Britain, 
Bethmann was willing to limit the German navy only if Germany's leverage 
over France and Russia could thereby be increased. The price of an 
Anglo-German naval agreement was a guarantee of British neutrality in 
a Continental war. Bethmann had sought such terms as early as 1909. 
In that year he had resisted Kiderlen-Wachter's suggestion that London 
and Berlin simply agree not to take part "in an unprovoked attack upon 
the other" and had insisted that Britain's neutrality obligation should 
^^ Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor, p. 110. 
^^ Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres. Commission de Publication des Documents 
Relatifs aux Origines de la Guerre de 1914, Documents diplomatique s frangais , 
3rd ser. (Paris, 1929-36), 9: 177 (Cambon to Doumergue, July 28, 1914). Beth- 
mann warned Cambon not to thwart Germany in Turkey. 
^^ Fischer, War of Illusions, p. 259. 
464 Kaiser 
cover any case in which Germany had acted under the Triple Alliance. 
He went even further in 1912, insisting that Britain and Germany pledge 
one another neutrality should either "become entangled in a war with 
one or more powers. "^^ The British refused to consider this proposal in 
1912, but we shall see that Bethmann reverted to it at the height of the 
July crisis in 1914. 
Bethmann 's armaments policy closely reflected his foreign policy goals. 
As Bulow had planned as early as 1908, Bethmann in 1912 successfully 
reduced the tempo of naval construction after a long struggle with Tirpitz, 
pleading both financial necessity and the need for a massive expansion 
of the army. The slowdown in naval construction kept the chances for 
an agreement with England alive; the army was vastly expanded for the 
first time in many years partly as a means to reduce naval spending, 
partly because of a decision within the army finally to accept more bour- 
geois officers, and partly because of a growing fear of French and Russian 
strength which Bethmann very definitely shared. ^^ But the new emphasis 
on the army did not reflect any renewed interest in Continental expansion. 
Both Bethmann's prewar statements and his war aims policy indicate 
that he fully appreciated the difficulties of any extension of Germany's 
frontiers. ^^ The increases in the army seem instead to have been designed 
to extort or conquer a colonial empire on the battlefields of Europe. once 
British neutrality had been purchased by naval limitations, the enlarged 
German army would leave France and Russia no choice but to give in in 
any future crisis over Asia Minor or African colonies. 
The German government's determination to share in new colonial ex- 
pansion brought war significantly nearer during the second Moroccan 
crisis, but the cautious attitudes of a few key officials stillkept the peace. 
Kiderlen's strategy in 1911 resembled Holstein's in 1905, but with the 
difference that Kiderlen wanted substantial colonial gains. War, he initially 
argued, would not be necessary, but the French would be willing to 
surrender the whole French Congo as compensation if convinced that 
^' Ibid. pp. 64-65, 124-26. In the spring of 1909, shortly before Bulow's 
resignation, the chancellor had discussed a possible naval and political agreement 
with various high officials. Curiously a draft of an Anglo-German neutrality 
agreement prepared in the German Foreign Office at that time included an escape 
clause releasing either party from its obligation to remain neutral should the 
other party attack a third country; see J. Lepsius et al. , eds. , Die Grosse Politik 
der Europdischen Kabinette J87J-J9J4 (Berlin, 1924-28), 28: nos. 10302-03, 
10306. Bethmann refused any such escape clause. 
^2 Martin Kitchen, The German Officer Corps 1 890-1914 (Oxford, 1968), pp. 
31-36. 
^^ Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor, pp. 192-93, 206. 
Germany and the Origins of World War I 465 
Germany was ready to fight. This in turn would ultimately enable Germany 
to walk off with much of the Belgian Congo and create a unified central 
African empire from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. ^"^ Later a drunken 
Kiderlen appeared to Bethmann to aim at war, but agreed that it was not 
strictly necessary. ^^ Moltke also believed that Germany could only secure 
a favorable outcome if it remained willing to unsheath the sword. But 
William drew back from the prospect of war, and while the army felt 
ready for action, the navy did not. ''As regards the war at sea," Tirpitz 
wrote, "the timing is as unfavorable as possible. With every year that 
passes we shall be in a much more favorable position. Heligoland, the 
canal, dreadnoughts, submarines etc."^^ Bethmann hardly seems to have 
been determined to avoid war; he agreed with Kiderlen that the possibility 
must be reckoned with, and according to his assistant Kurt Riezler agreed 
''that the people need a war."^^ In the end the government decided to 
settle for a slice of the French Congo as compensation, partly, it seems, 
because its Triple Alliance partners seemed unwilling to join in a war 
unleashed by Germany. ^^ Outrage in the Reichstag and much of the press 
showed that the government lagged well behind Conservative and National 
Liberal opinion in this regard. "It is false that in Germany the nation is 
peaceful but the government bellicose," wrote French Ambassador Jules 
Cambon, " — the exact opposite is true."^^ 
The question of war and peace did not directly arise during the first 
Balkan War because the government of Austria-Hungary did not wish to 
intervene against Serbia and risk a European war.^^ Still, William II 
bluntly raised the issue of war with England, France, and Russia at the 
now-famous "War Council" of December 8, 1912. William's interlo- 
cutors — including Moltke, Tirpitz, and Admiral Georg von Muller, the 
chief of his naval cabinet — probably realized the emperor called the 
council in a temporary rage provoked by reports that Britain would join 
'^^ This is the import of his letter of resignation in July; see Fischer, War of 
Illusions, pp. 16-11 . 
^^ Riezler, Tagebucher, pp. 178-180. 
^^ Fischer, War of Illusions, p. 84. 
^^ Riezler, Tagebiicher, p. 180. 
"^^ Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 84-85. 
^^ Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor, p. 124. 
^° Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914 (London, 1952-57), 1: 
364-402, is much more convincing on this point than Fischer, War of Illusions, 
pp. 153-59, 209-16, who argues that Germany had to restrain Austria. See also 
F R. Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo. The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary , 
1866-1914 (London, 1972), pp. 344-47, and Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "In- 
fluence, Power, and the Policy Process: The Case of Franz Ferdinand, 1906- 
1914," HistoricalJournal 17: 2 (1974): 417-34. 
466 Kaiser 
France in a war with Germany even if the war began in Eastern Europe. 
Probably Bethmann was not invited to emphasize the bankruptcy of his 
attempts to conciliate England. At the council Moltke again argued for 
war sooner rather than later, although as Miiller noted, he did not suggest 
that war be immediately provoked. Tirpitz on the contrary argued that 
war should be postponed for eighteen months. By this time Tirpitz's 
colleagues had grasped the real nature of his policy; Moltke at this con- 
ference correctly anticipated that ''the Navy would not be ready even 
then." The conference, as Muller concluded, had no real result. ^^ In 
subsequent months Vienna became more bellicose, but no one in the 
German government — not even Moltke — showed much enthusiasm for 
a war over the Balkans. ^^ 
The crisis of July 1914 was not unleashed by the German government. 
Serbian nationalists within and outside the Serbian government planned 
the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, and most of the Austro-Hungarian 
leadership had already decided upon drastic action against Serbia before 
Count Hoyos went on his mission to Berlin. ^^ The chronic paralysis over 
questions of war and peace within the German government makes it 
unlikely that Berlin ever would have provoked a war out of the blue; to 
a certain extent the Germans had to be pushed into the war by exogenous 
impulses. Yet the chancellor's reactions to the crisis reflected his own 
longstanding foreign policy goals. If Vienna made the initial decision to 
fight, Berlin followed for its own reasons. 
Bethmann Hollweg in 1914 felt dissatisfied with the results of his 
policy. Although in July he finally concluded the Baghdad Railway 
Agreement with London, his attempts to make a new agreement regarding 
the Portuguese colonies had proven embarrassing. In 1913 he had an- 
nounced that such talks were underway, only to find that London insisted 
that any new agreement be public, and that it be accompanied by the 
publication of the Windsor Treaty, under which Britain guaranteed the 
Portuguese colonies, as well. Talks on the future of the Belgian Congo 
had gone nowhere, not least because the French had already been promised 
a say in its eventual disposition. ^"^ And in place of his vaunted neutrality 
^' Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 161-62. 
^2 Ibid., pp. 213-219. 
^^ See Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "Vienna and July 1914: The Origins of the 
Great War once More," in Essays on World War I: Origins and Prisoners of 
War, ed. Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., and Peter Pastor (New York, 1983), pp. 
23-24; and the protocol of the Austro-Hungarian Council of Ministers for Common 
Affairs, 7 July 1914, reprinted in Immanuel Geiss, July 1 9 14. The Outbreak of 
the First World War: Selected Documents (New York, 1974), no. 9. 
^^ Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 310-320; see also G. P. Gooch and Harold 
Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War (London, 1926- 
38), vol. 10, pt. 2, nos. 266, 351, 370. 
Germany and the Origins of World War I 467 
agreement, Bethmann faced rumors of an Anglo-Russian naval conven- 
tion.^^ 

on July 7 — one day after Bethmann had assured Hoyos of German 
support in all eventualities — the chancellor unburdened himself to Riezler 
at his Hohenfinow estate. Extraordinarily pessimistic, he clearly regarded 
his attempts at detaching Britain from the entente as a failure. He described 
the rumored Anglo-Russian naval agreement as ''the last link in the 
chain" and characterized the anglophile German Ambassador Lichnowsky 
as too trusting and too easily led by the British. He reported Austria's 
determination to act, adding that an action by Austria against Serbia 
''could lead to world war" — that is, to a war including Britain. The next 
day he noted that the current situation was not without advantages: "If 
war comes from the east, so that we must fight for Austria-Hungary and 
not Austria-Hungary for us, then we have a chance of winning. [The day 
before he had said that Austria was incapable of fighting for German 
interests; he was probably thinking of the second Moroccan crisis, when 
Vienna had not stood up for Berlin.] If war does not come, if the Tsar 
does not want it or a dismayed France counsels peace, then we have a 
chance to divide the entente over this question." Russia's growing strength 
still obsessed him; new Russian railways in Poland, he remarked, would 
render Germany's strategic position untenable. ^^ 
Bethmann, then, viewed the crisis as an opportunity drastically to 
improve Germany's international position — in peace if possible, by war 
if necessary. ^^ If the entente refused to fight, Germany's political su- 
premacy would be secure and the path to future overseas expansion open; 
if war did come, better that it come now rather than later, since the 
balance of forces could only become less favorable for Germany. 
Throughout the July crisis Bethmann insisted upon confronting Russia 
and France with a choice between a humiliating diplomatic defeat and 
war. As for his war aims, Bethmann made them entirely clear on July 
29, while extending his "neutrality bid" to British Ambassador Sir Edward 
Goschen. Alluding to the possiblity of a general war should Russia "attack 
Austria," he expressed his hope that Britain would remain neutral. Be- 
^^ While it is true that naval talks were planned they would not apparently 
have led to any real result. Sir Edward Grey wrote in late April that there was 
no real possibility of combined operations. Such conversations would "amount 
simply to letting Russia know that our naval forces would be used outside the 
Baltic, and that Russia could put her own naval forces to the best use inside the 
Baltic" {British Documents, vol. 10, pt. 2, no. 541 [Grey to Bertie, May 1, 
1914]). 
^^ Riezler, Tagebucher, pp. 182-84. 
^^ Fischer goes much too far in arguing that the above-quoted passages show 
a preference for war; see War of Illusions, pp. 479-480. 
468 Kaiser 
lieving that Britain would never allow France to be crushed, he assured 
the British government that if London remained neutral a victorious Ger- 
many Would respect the territorial integrity of France. In reply to Goschen's 
question he declined to give such an assurance regarding the French 
colonies. He pledged to respect Dutch neutrality but clearly foreshadowed 
the invasion of Belgium, adding that if Belgium did not takes sides 
against Germany, her integrity would be respected after the conclusion 
of the war. ''Finally, His Excellency said that he trusted that these as- 
surances might form the basis of a further understanding with England 
which, as you well know, had been the object of his policy ever since 
he had been Chancellor."^^ 
The war, then, was not designed to conquer European territory — or at . 
the very least, not Western European territory — but to establish German 
military supremacy on the Continent and secure a much larger colonial 
empire, including the entire French Congo and possibly Morocco as 
well. The occupation of Belgium under the Schlieffen Plan would also 
offer excellent chances for the extension of German influence over the 
Belgian Congo, the prize which Berlin had long coveted above all others. 
Such aims had evidently been under discussion in Berlin for at least a 
week; the shipping magnate Albert Ballin had arrived in London on July 
20 and had made a similar offer to Winston Churchill on July 25.^^ They 
reflected the policy Bethmann had followed since becoming chancellor: 
by assuring London that he had no designs upon the British Empire itself, 
he hoped to win Britain's sanction for expansion at the expense of others. 
As Bethmann told the Reichstag several months later, he had hoped that 
''Germany's growing strength and the growing risk of war would compel 
Britain to realize that [the principle of the balance of power] had become 
untenable and impracticable and that a peaceful settlement with Germany 
was preferable."^^ If Britain would not accept this bargain it would be 
as well to begin war now. The basic principle of Bethmann's policy was 
his conviction that Germany had to expand. Because of this conviction, 
and because of his belief that Germany's chances were slipping away, 
he'regarded his risky policy in July 1914 as "a leap in the dark and a 
most difficult duty."^^ The war Bethmann unleashed was indeed a grasp 
at world power; in that essential sense Fischer is entirely correct. 
Bethmann seems to have made the decision to risk war on his own; 
the argument of Wolfgang Mommsen and Konrad Jarausch that the military 
^^Geiss,yM/>^ J9J4, no. 139. 
^^ Lamar Cecil, Albert Ballin. Business and Politics in Imperial Germany, 
1888-1918 (Princeton, 1967), pp. 206-7. 
^° Fischer, War of Illusions, p. 548. 
^' Riezler, Tagebiicher, p. 185. 
Germany and the Origins of World War I 469 
forced Bethmann into a compromise policy likely to lead to war is not 
supported by the evidence. Certainly the military had long pressed for a 
preventive war, and Helmuth von Moltke, the Chief of the General Staff, 
favored one in the spring of 1914.^^ But only a few weeks before the 
assassination of Franz Ferdinand, Bethmann had agreed with the Bavarian 
minister to Berlin that the moment for a preventive war had passed and 
added that the emperor would never consent to one.^^ More significantly, 
the military seems to have played no role whatever in the July decisions 
that actually led to the conflict. Moltke was taking a cure when Hoyos 
visited Potsdam. When War Minister Erich von Falkenhayn wrote Moltke 
on July 5 he expressed doubts that Austria really intended any serious 
action. When Moltke finally returned to Berlin on July 28 the memorandum 
he sent Bethmann was most temperate in tone.^"* Bethmann was as willing 
as Moltke to allow matters to come to war with Russia; as early as July 
23 Bethmann told Riezler that if Russia mobilized Germany would strike. ^^ 
Furthermore, war took place only because Bethmann circumvented 
the decision-making structure of the German government. Had the chan- 
cellor felt after the Hoyos mission that he had been coerced into a dangerous 
policy he would have had ample opportunity to save the situation and 
preserve peace. Tirpitz, who was also taking the waters during the Hoyos 
mission, would surely oppose a risky policy on the grounds that the navy 
was not yet ready for war; only two months earlier he had told Admiral 
von Miiller that the fleet needed six to eight years of additional prepa- 
ration.^^ More important was William, who was bound to turn tail as 
soon as danger came near. Yet Bethmann refused to summon Tirpitz to 
Berlin — the grand admiral returned on his own initiative on July 28 — 
and encouraged William to take his North Sea cruise. When on July 27 
William finally did return, Bethmann effectively circumvented his attempts 
to preserve peace by forcing the ''Halt in Belgrade" plan upon Vienna — 
a plan which in Tirpitz's opinion removed all pretext for war.^^ The 
^^ Egmont Zechlin, "Motive und Taktik der Reichsleitung 1914," Der Monat 
209 (February 1966): 91-95; see also Isabel V. Hull, The Entourage of Kaiser 
Wilhelm II 1888-1918 (New York, 1982), pp. 236-65. 
^^ P. Dirr, ed., Bayerische Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch undzum Versailler 
Schuldspruch (Munich, 1922), no. 1 (Lerchenfeld to Hertling, June 4, 1914). 
^^ Geiss,yM/>^ 1914, nos. 7, 125. 
^^ Riezler, Tagebiicher, p. 190. 
^^ J. C. G. Rohl, "Admiral von Muller and the Approach of War, 1911-14," 
HistoricalJournal 12: 4 (1969): 667. 
^^ Walter Gorlitz, The Kaiser and His Court. The Diaries, Notebooks and 
Letters of Admiral Georg Alexander von Miiller, Chief of the Naval Cabinet, 
1914-18 (London, 1961), p. 10; Albertini, Origins of the War of 1914, 2: 446- 
527. 
470 Kaiser 
pressures that had kept Germany out of war in 1905, 1911, and 1912 
failed in 1 9 1 4 because the chancellor did not allow them to make themselves 
felt. 
And what of the argument that the German government in 1914 chose 
war as a means of dealing with the growing Social Democratic threat? 
Here the evidence is unequivocal: whatever the views of the military and 
the Pan-German extremists, the chancellor regarded any attempt to use 
war in such a way as both futile and unwise. In June 1914 he told the 
Bavarian minister that a new war would not turn Germany rightward: 
''on the contrary a World War with its incalculable consequences would 
strengthen tremendously the power of Social Democracy, because they 
[sic] preached peace, and would topple many a throne. "^^ on July 7 he 
told Riezler that he expected from a war ''a revolution of everything 
existing" ; the Conservative Heydebrand's view that war might strengthen 
the patriarchal order and spirit he viewed as ''nonsense. "^^ Nor of course 
did he make the slightest attempt to use the war to crack down on Socialism. 
Thwarting the military's plans to arrest all Socialist leaders at the outset 
of hostilities, he instead assured himself of the SPD's loyalty personally, 
and made it clear from the beginning of the war that the people, as Biilow 
had predicted, would have to be rewarded for their tremendous sacrifices. 
Some evidence does suggest that Bethmann thought a war might have 
favorable domestic consequences of a more general character. During 
the second Moroccan crisis Riezler wrote that Bethmann shared "the 
truly German, idealistic conviction that the people need a war."^^^ Ad- 
dressing the new Reichstag in February 1912 he had voiced his belief 
that the German people and the parties had a "deep longing ... for aims 
which are worth fighting for."^^^ In July 1914 he was deeply disturbed 
by Germany's internal condition: to Riezler he referred to the "miserable 
decline of the political leadership. Individuals as such become smaller 
and more meaningless, no one says anything great or true. The failure 
of the intelligentsia, the professors." Unlike Riezler he was not certain 
what the German people's response to war would be, though he was 
moved by the determination of public opinion late in the crisis. ^^^ While 
extremely important, these vague statements certainly do not suggest 
that he regarded Socialism as the chief threat to Germany. Rather they 
^^ Geiss,yMfy 1914, p. 47. 
^^ Riezler, Tagebiicher, p. 183. 
'°° Riezler, Tagebiicher, p. 180. Having originally written "idealistic and 
correct conviction {richtige Oberzeugung), Riezler crossed out "richtige" and 
put a question mark in the margin of his diary. 
'°' Fischer, War of Illusions, p. 104. 
'°2 Riezler, Tagebucher, pp. 183, 185, 193. 
Germany and the Origins of World War I All 
reflect the distaste of the idealist Bethmann for the political fragmentation 
and selfishness characteristic of his time — qualities for which he criticized 
all the German parties, and above all the Conservatives. 
As the chancellor in 1914 Bethmann still controlled German foreign 
policy, far more so indeed than he had in 1911 when he had had to 
contend with the formidable figure of Kiderlen. He remained subordinate 
to the emperor, but could easily have seized upon William's eagerness 
for a peaceful solution to the July crisis had he wished to do so. Despite 
Austria-Hungary's determination to punish the Serbs, war was not in- 
evitable. Unable to begin military operations until August 12, the Vienna 
government could not possibly have held out against united pressure to 
accept some variant of the ''Halt in Belgrade" plan.^^^ Furthermore, 
during the crisis Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov made it clear 
again and again that he was more than willing to see Serbia severely 
chastised if only Vienna would agree to modify its ultimatum and treat 
its quarrel with Serbia as a European question. ^^"^ A solution to the crisis 
along these lines might not have solved Austria-Hungary's fundamental 
problems, but it would have substantially increased the prestige of the 
Triple Alliance. Certainly it could not have been construed as a humiliation 
to Germany, especially since no direct German interest was at stake. 
Bethmann held to a more dangerous course because he, unlike Bulow, i 
believed that Germany's need for expansion justified the risks, particularly | 
since he believed that Germany's chances were slipping away. In that ' 
sense Bethmann was a victim of the idea of Weltpolitik — an idea which 
by 1914 had outgrown its relatively modest origins. Historians must 
trace more precisely the diffusion of the belief in the inadequacy of 
Germany's international position; clearly it was not merely a tool used 
by the government to increase its support. Even before 1897 expansionist 
ideas had a broad following, and by 1911, if not 1908, extragovernmental 
opinion had become far more bellicose than the Imperial government 
'°^ See Albertini, Origins of the War of 1914, 2: 466-527 and 651-673, and 
3: 232-36. It is difficult to accept the argument of Andreas Hillgruber, Germany 
and the Two World Wars (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), pp. 26-32, that Bethmann 
had planned to have the powers step in and negotiate a settlement of the crisis 
all along. 
^^^ See for example Geiss, July 1914, no. 90, 100, 141a. on July 27 the 
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Friedrich Szapary, reported Sazonov 's statement 
that "He had no feelings for the Balkan Slavs. They were actually a heavy burden 
on Russia and we could hardly imagine how much trouble they had already given 
Russia. Our [Vienna's] aims, as described by me, were perfectly legitimate but 
he thought the way we had chosen to attain them not the safest" (Albertini, 
Origins of the War of 1914, 2: 404-05). 
472 Kaiser 
itself. ^^^ German statesmen could hardly ignore public opinion, but to 
them fell the responsibility to balance the pressure for expansion with a 
more realistic calculation of Germany's national interests. In this task 
Bethmann Hollweg failed dismally. 
Germany's situation in 1914 justified neither the general belief in its 
need for colonial expansion nor the increasing doubts as to its future 
security. Her growing population and industry did require increased foreign 
commerce, but German trade statistics gave no cause for alarm. German 
exports, which had been increasing steadily since the early 1890s, had 
grown even more rapidly in the immediate prewar years. Total exports 
had increased more than 50 percent since 1909, and Germany's negative 
trade balance had shrunk dramatically in 1912 and 1913. Nor did the 
statistics show any great need for colonial expansion. 82 percent of 
German imports came from European and American countries; 91 percent 
of German exports went to these countries. ^^^ High German officials 
occasionally admitted the somewhat mythical character of the need for 
German expansion — Gottfried von Jagow admitted to a British diplomat 
in 1913 that Germany did not really know what she wanted^^^ — but seemed 
incapable of acting upon that realization. ''The imperialism, nationalism, 
and economic materialism, which during the last generation determined 
the outlines of every nation's policy," Bethmann wrote in August 1914, 
''set goals which could only be pursued at the cost of a general confla- 
gration. "^^^ Himself unschooled in foreign affairs, he never challenged 
the assumption that these goals could justify such a conflagration. 
Furthermore, the chancellor's fear of Russian power — which the war 
showed to be groundless — was not shared by those in the best position 
to know. In early 1914 neither the German nor the Austro-Hungarian nor 
the French Ambassador to Russia believed that Russia had any aggressive 
designs upon Germany. "I cannot agree with the view that we must 
reckon with aggressive plans from our eastern neighbor within a few 
years," German Ambassador Friedrich von Pourtales wrote Bethmann 
on March 1 1. In January Friedrich Szapary predicted that economic cir- 
'^^ Stegmann, Eley, and Wernecke provide many valuable insights about the 
movement of German opinion, but a more systematic study is needed. Another 
suggestive book is Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and a World without 
War (Princeton, 1975). 
'°^ Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1914 (Berlin, 1914), 
pp. 253-258. 
'^^ "The desire for expansion had grown up concomitantly with [her] commercial 
development, but there had been no preconceived scheme of expansion" (Rodd 
to Grey, January 6, 1913, British Documents, vol. 10, pt. 2, no. 454). 
'^^ Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor, p. 180-81. 
Germany and the Origins of World War I 473 
cumstances would incline the Russians ''toward political detente," and 
that those elements who wanted a war to divert attention from Russia's 
internal problems ''should hardly be given serious consideration." He 
confirmed this view in April. on April 14 Maurice Paleologue reported 
that despite a heated Russo-German press campaign none of the top 
Russian civilian or military leaders expected a real crisis, and that Russian 
rearmament simply aimed at making Russia secure. ^^^ And although 
some aspects of Russian rearmament were impressive, some observers 
understood the real lesson of the Russo-Japanese war — that Russia's 
immense population masked fundamental weaknesses that would take 
many years to correct. ^^^ European observers differed over the question 
of Russia's military, economic, and political preparedness for war, but 
Bethmann's view of a powerful colossus with designs upon Germany 
was certainly an extreme one.^^^ 
Just as Bethmann overestimated the overseas benefits of war, so he 
understimated its domestic dangers. During its brief history Imperial 
Germany never overcame a host of serious regional, religious, political, 
and class antagonisms. Such divisions did not make Germany ungov- 
ernable, but they severely restricted the government's freedom of move- 
ment. To govern successfully the chancellor continually had to mediate 
among various governmental institutions, political parties, and social 
groups. Btilow played this role well until 1908-09, when he antagonized 
the emperor over the Daily Telegraph affair and the Conservatives over 
taxation. More importantly, he understood that Germany's delicately 
'°^ See the Grosse Politik, vol. 39, no. 15844, and also nos. 15843 and 15858; 
Ludwig Bittner et al. , eds. , Oesterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosnischen 
Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914 (Vienna, 1930), 7: nos. 9219, 9411, 
9417, 9573; Documents diplomatique s frangais, 3rd ser., 9: 105. British Am- 
bassador Sir George Buchanan had great respect for Russia's growing strength 
but did not address the question of Russia's intentions; see Buchanan to Grey, 
March 18, 1914, British Documents, vol. 9, part 2, nos. 528, 529. 
"° Both the French and German military attaches in St. Petersburg still saw 
serious weaknesses in the Russian army in late 1913 (Risto Ropponen, Die Kraft 
Russlands [Helsinki, 1968], pp. 280-81). British and German naval attaches 
were even more critical (see Commander H. G. Grenfell to Ambassador Sir 
George Buchanan, March 19, 1914 [British Documents , vol. 9, part 2, no. 531]). 
'" See Ropponen, Die Kraft Russlands, especially pp. 196-296, for an excellent 
survey of views of Russia. Hillgruber, Germany and the Two World Wars, p. 
25, notes that Bethmann's fears "can only partially be explained by incredible 
ignorance about Russia," but suggests no further explanation (Fritz Stern, 
"Bethmann Hollweg and the War: The Limits of Responsibility," in Krieger and 
Stem, eds.. The Responsibility of Power, pp. 271-288, also wrestles inconclusively 
with the issue of Bethmann's remarkable pessimism). 
474 Kaiser 
balanced political structure was unlikely to survive a major war — even 
if Germany won — and tailored his foreign policy accordingly. In an age 
of imperialism crises were inevitable, but Biilow steered a careful course. 
He consoled himself with the observation that Germany's strength was 
increasing, both absolutely and relatively, and that the government faced 
no serious domestic or foreign threats. All this was perfectly true. In 
retrospect the common contemporary criticism of Bulow — that he con- 
cealed the failures of his policy with fine words — seems heavy with 
irony. 
By contrast, Bethmann seems more fatalistic about the international 
situation and less willing to accept the limitations of Germany's domestic 
structure. He continually complained about the disunity and selfishness 
of German political life without apparently recognizing the limitations 
these factors must inevitably impose upon his freedom of action. More 
than once Riezler railed at ''this damnably confused modern world . . . 
so complex that it can neither be grasped nor predicted," and Bethmann 
frequently wished that the parties would put their particular interests 
aside for the common good.^^^ The chancellor underestimated the dangers 
Germany's fragmented structure might pose in a real crisis; indeed, several 
of his remarks suggest that he hoped that selfishness would make way 
for a new unity in a great struggle. The result was the reverse. The war 
provoked new quarrels over war aims and the internal future of the empire, 
and domestic divisions became so bitter that the chancellor's role as a 
mediator became impossible. Eventually all shades of opinion united in 
seeking his dismissal, and with his chancellorship perished the system 
that had ruled Germany since 1871 . 
Since the late nineteenth century the enormous potential power of the 
modern state has fascinated statesmen, publicists, and historians. Yet 
the exercise of that power has frequently been thwarted by other char- 
acteristics of modern states and societies: the difficulty of coordinating 
their numerous institutions, the inevitable fragmentation of authority 
from which they suffer, the tendency of bureaucratic routine and inertia 
to undercut changes in policy, and the enormous political strains that 
inevitably accompany any drastic reallocation of resources either at home 
or abroad. In subsequent years the dilemmas of Bulow, who recognized 
bureaucratic inertia and political conflict as useful checks upon unrea- 
sonable ambition, and Bethmann, whose attempt to cut an imaginary 
Gordian knot ended in disaster, have proven to be characteristic of the 
twentieth century. Imperial Germany was the first but not the last modern 
state to succumb to the fascination of its power while ignoring the con- 
straints upon its use. 
"^ Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor, p. 165.