과학의 경험적 토대는 절대적이 아니다

과학의 경험적 토대는 절대적이 아니다.hwp

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                    과학의 경험적 토대는 절대적이 아니다

 

객관적 과학의 경험적 토대에는 그리하여 ‘절대적인’ 것이 없다. 과학은 견고한 기반에 근거하지 않는다. 과학적 이론들의 대담한 구조는, 말하자면, 습지 위에서 올라간다. 그 구조는 말뚝들 위에 세워진 건물과 같다. 말뚝들은 위에서부터 아래 습지 속으로 박히지 자연적이거나 ‘주어진’ 토대 아래로 박히지 않는다; 그래서 우리가 말뚝을 더 깊이 박는 것을 중단한다면, 그것은 우리가 확고한 지반에 도달했기 때문이 아니다. 최소한 당분간 말뚝들이 구조를 지탱하기에 충분히 확고하여 우리가 만족할 때 우리는 멈출 따름이다.

ㅡ 칼 포퍼, “과학적 발견의 논리”, 1968년, 111쪽 ㅡ

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The empirical basis of objective science has thus nothing 'absolute' about it. 4 Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or 'given' base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4 Weyl (op. cit., p. 83, English edition p. 116) writes: '. . . this pair of opposites, subjective- absolute and objective-relative seems to me to contain one of the most profound epistemological truths which can be gathered from the study of nature. Whoever wants the absolute must get subjectivity — ego-centricity — into the bargain, and whoever longs for objectivity cannot avoid the problem of relativism.' And before this we find, 'What is immediately experienced is subjective and absolute . . . ; the objective world, on the other hand, which natural science seeks to precipitate in pure crystalline form ... is relative'. Born expresses himself in similar terms (Die Relativitdtstheorie Einsteins und ilire physikalischen Grundlagen, 3rd edition, 1 922, Introduction). Fundamentally, this view is Kant's theory of objectivity consistently developed (cf. section 8 and note 5 to that section). Reininger also refers to this situation. He writes in Das Psycho-Physische Problem, 1 91 6, p. 29, 'Metaphysics as science is impossible . . . because although the absolute is indeed experienced, and for that reason can be intuitively felt, it yet refuses to be expressed in words. For "Sphcht die Seele, so spricht, ach! schon die Seele nicht mehr". (If the soul speaks then alas it is no longer the soul that speaks.)'